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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to compare the presi­
dential styles of the three leaders of France’s Fifth Repub­
lic within the realm of foreign policy.
A framework of analysis was devised to compare the 
performance of De Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard in office. 
Each man is analyzed in terms of the experiences and condi­
tions that molded his world view; the support and opposition 
that he encountered in carrying out his programs; the goals 
that he hoped to achieve and the image that he projected to 
the world. This study deals as much with personalities as 
with issues. Only three issues are considered in depth: the
Common Market (EEC), NATO, and East-West relations.
It is suggested that the institutional arrangement 
of the Fifth Republic provides France’s president a. unique 
opportunity to leave his personal imprint on French foreign 
policy.
This comparison demonstrates that there are more 
substantive differences among the three presidents than 
might be apparent to the casual observer. The most obvious 
differences are in style, especially when one compares de 
Gaulle and Giscard. Each president appears to have made a 
conscious effort to distinguish himself from his predeces­
sors in matters of style.
THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC 
A Study in Presidential Styles
INTRODUCTION
The three presidents of France's Fifth Republic 
have displayed unique and sometimes divergent styles in the 
conduct of foreign affairs. From June 1958 through April 
1969> Charles de Gaulle alone formulated French foreign 
policy.^- His was a very personal style. France's inter­
national posture was an extension of the General's persona­
lity and prejudices. The foreign policies of Georges 
Pompidou reflected the .the Gaullist heritage' with the notable 
exception of Britain's admission to the Common Market in 1972* 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who became -the Fifth Republic's 
first non-Gaullist president in May 197^ > has differed from 
his predecessors in matters of style and of substance.
Under Giscard, France has become less vehemently anti-NATO 
and less stridently anti-American. The French leader has 
demonstrated his ability to work amicably with London and 
Washington. Relations between France and its neighbors have 
changed considerably since 1958. The purpose of this study 
is to examine the evolution of French foreign policy during 
the past two decades and to compare the presidential styles 
of de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard.
2
3The constitution of the Fifth Republic assigns 
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs 
to the executive. Through a liberal interpretation of 
Article Five, de Gaulle accorded himself virtual autonomy 
in foreign relations. Article Five defines the president 
as "the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity 
of the territory, and of respect for Community agreements
p
and treaties." Article Twenty-one delegates responsibility
for national defense to the prime minister. De Gaulle ignored
this separation of powers and established foreign policy and
national defense as his private domains. The General believed
that the only solution to France's foreign policy problems was
a strong executive. He articulated this conviction on June
16, 19^6, in his now-famous Bayeux speech.
It would be the duty of the Chief of State 
to reconcile, in the choice of men, the 
general interest with the orientation that 
emerges from the Parliament; it would be 
his mission to nominate the ministers and, 
of course, firstly the premier who is to 
direct the policy and the work of the 
Government; it would be the function of 
the Chief of State to promulgate the Laws 
and to issue the decrees, for it is toward 
the State as a whole that citizens are 
obligated by them; he would have the task 
of presiding over the cabinet meetings and 
exercising there the influence of continuity 
without with a nation cannot survive; he 
would serve as arbiter above political con­
tingencies, either normally through the 
Council, or, in moments of grave confusion, 
by inviting the country to make known its 
sovereign decisions through elections; he 
would have, if it were to happen that the 
nation were in peril, the duty to safeguard 
national independence and the treaties con­
cluded by France.3
Between 19^6 and 1958, the twenty-three cabinets
k
of the Fourth Republic had grappled with overseas policy.
Crises in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria had con­
tributed to the demise of several governments and had helped 
to topple successive cabinets. In de Gaulle's view, lack of 
consensus within the parliament was largely responsible for 
France's poor record in foreign affairs. He considered the 
parliament a morass, characterized by numerous parties and 
conflicting interests, and in itself a primary cause of France' 
overseas predicament. "In brief," he noted at Bayeux, "the 
rivalry of parties is in our country a fundamental character­
istic, always questioning everything and before which, too 
often, the higher interests of the country are obscured."-^
When he received an electoral mandate as president 
of the fledgling Fifth Republic in January 1959* de Gaulle 
insisted upon taking foreign policy into his own hands.
Foreign policy was designed in the Elysee Palace and pre­
sented to the National Assembly as an accomplished fact.
Critics have noted that the General was uncertain 
how to resolve the Algerian crisis when he assumed office.
This criticism is substantiated by de Gaulle's erratic 
behavior toward Algeria. One author has described de Gaulle 
as a master of the equivocal statement.^ When he announced 
"I have understood you" to the demands of French Algerians 
in the Forum of Algiers on June 1958, he was expressing 
an appreciation of their situation rather than agreement with 
their views. The General vacillated between a military solu­
tion in Algeria and the granting of total independence. He
5came under pressure from such sources as the United Nations, 
Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), Algerian-born 
Frenchmen (pieds-noirs), and his own generals. Though his 
solution did not placate all of these elements, metropolitan 
France approved it in a popular referendum. De Gaulle deserves 
most of the credit for this achievement.
The General's solution to the Algerian problem 
established a precedent in French foreign policy. Not since 
Pierre Mendes-France staked his reputation on an acceptable 
conclusion to the Indochina conflict in July 195^ had a French 
leader resolved an overseas crisis. De Gaulle was to continue 
this style in his treatment of the NATO alliance, and in his 
relations with the United States, Great Britain, and French 
Quebec. His rallying cry of "Long live free Quebec!" during 
a state visit to Canada on July 25> 1967V shocked his hosts.
His insistence on the development of an independent nuclear 
strike force also frustrated his Western allies. The French 
leader was reluctant to depend on the American nuclear umbrella 
in the event of a Soviet invasion of West Germany. He did not 
believe that the United States would commit its nuclear wea­
pons against the Soviet Union and sought to develop an indep­
endent French arsenal. Since an effective deterrent is 
designed to prevent a war rather than win one, Western analy­
sts have questioned that deterrent value of the French nuclear 
capability. Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1969 that "deterrence-- 
the policy of preventing an action by confronting the opponent 
with risks he is unwilling to run--depends in the first
6instance on psychological criteria. What the potential aggre­
ssor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true.
7
Deterrence occurs above all xn the minds of men.' Never­
theless, de Gaulle perservered, and to this day France steers 
an independent nuclear course.
Sometimes de Gaulle's policies seemed contradictory. 
He originally opposed decolonication in Algeria; four years 
later he granted independence to Algeria. Though he accepte 
regional integration through such organizations as the Euro­
pean Economic Community, he opposed Britain's entry to the 
Common Market and refused to allow the French military to 
participate actively in NATO. Though he held open referenda 
on his policies of Algerian self-determination and independence, 
he summarily withdrew French forces from NATO in 1966 after 
perfunctory consultations with only three cabinet members. 
Despite these contradictions, he solved the colonial problem, 
stabilized the government, aided modernization, and did much 
to enhance his nation's status as a world power.
It was a standard joke within the legislature of 
the Fourth Republic that parliament formulated foreign policy, 
the executive approved it, and no one implemented it. De 
Gaulle proved this clich6 wrong. In the Fifth Republic, the 
president formulated, approved, and implemented foreign 
policy.
De Gaulle believed that his authority derived from 
his credentials and from his special relationship with the 
French people. On January 29» I960, he launched the following
7appeal: "By virtue of the mandate that the people have
given me and of the national legitimacy that I have embodied 
for twenty years, I ask all men and women to support me, no
o
matter what happens." On January 6, 1961, he returned to 
this theme in an address about Algerian independence. "For 
more than twenty years, events have willed that I serve as the 
guide of the country during the grave crisis we have lived 
through ... But also, I need--yes, I need— to know what is in 
your hearts and minds. That is why I am turning to you, by­
passing all intermediaries. In truth--who is not aware of 
it--the matter is between each woman and man of France and 
myself.
In June 19^0, de Gaulle established a Free French 
movement in London after the collapse of the Third Republic. 
Throughout the war he considered himself and his group the 
true government of France and denounced the Vichy regime as 
a Nazi puppet. Directives issued by his office during the 
war often began, "We, Charles de Gaulle ..." Even during his 
absence from the political scene between 19^6 and 1958 he 
believed himself the embodiment of "The Eternal France," 
which he describes so eloquently in the opening pages of 
his War Memoirs.^
Though not inclined to view themselves as the pro­
duct of a great historical tradition, de Gaulle's successors 
have reflected his belief in a powerful presidency. Like 
de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou was a strong leader. After his 
election in June 1969» Pompidou consolidated Gaullist strength.
8The vital areas of foreign policy and defense remained within 
the jurisdiction of the president. Pompidou announced policy 
decisions without allowing debate either in the National Assem­
bly or among his own ministers. He advocated a powerful France 
that would remain independent of NATO, the United States, and 
the Soviet Union. In a deviation from the Gaullist path, 
Pompidou invited British Prime Minister Edward Heath to Paris 
for talks which resulted in Britain's admission to the EEC. 
Except for the issue of the Common Market, Pompidou's foreign 
policy was quite similar to de Gaulle's.
If de Gaulle and Pompidou appear to have been cast 
from the same political mold, such is not the case with Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing. As minister of finance under de Gaulle, 
Giscard criticized the General's solitary exercise of power, 
the authoritarian style of his regime, and his insufficient 
commitment to European solidarity. After his victory in the 
presidential election of 1965 by a mere 5^ percent of the 
second ballot, de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his govern­
ment . The General blamed his performance at the polls partly 
on Giscard's conservative economic policies, and cited the 
young man's "ambivalent attitude toward the government" as 
reason for his dismissal.^
The platform of Giscard's Independent Republicans
was more liberal, less anti-American, and more European than 
12de Gaulle's. Giscard considers himself a European as well 
as a Frenchman. He advocates an active French participation 
in the EEC, and envisions France as an integral part of the
9European community rather than an isolated and priviledged
member. He does not foresee the political unification of
Western Europe, however. In nuclear policy, he still guards
the autonomy of France’s nuclear strike force. Giscard does
not share de Gaulle's Anglophobia; in June 1976 he became
the first French president in sixteen years to visit
Britain. ^  He also enjoys a close personal relationship
with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Improved
relations among Paris, London, Bonn, and Washington have
lA
prompted Giscard to reconsider France's NATO position.
Pompidou reinstated Giscard as minister of finance 
in 1969. After the death of Pompidou in April 197^* Giscard 
won a closely contested election victory from Socialist candi­
date Francois Mitterrand by a margin of less than ^00,000 
v o t e s . H e  faces an equally strong challenge from the same 
quarter in the presidential election of 1981.
This comparison of the presidential styles of de 
Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard draws heavily upon the precedent 
of such American social scientists as James David Barber. His 
classic study of American presidential styles deals mainly
with the elements of personality that determine a man's per-
17formance in office. Barber attempts to fit presidents into 
specifically defined categories, which serve as instruments 
of analysis. This study will address broader aspects of pre­
sidential style, focusing upon the attitudes and actions of 
three individual decision-makers within the context of de 
Gaulle's Fifth Republic.
10
More than in most countries, France’s institutional 
framework permits its president virtual autonomy in the con­
duct of foreign affairs. The character of France's president, 
therefore, largely determines the character of French foreign 
policy. France's activities abroad readily reflect the ideals, 
values, motivations, perceptions, prejudices, and idiosyn- 
cracies of its chief executive.
This thesis will demonstrate the effect of individ­
ual style on the exercise of French foreign policy during the 
tenure of each of the three presidents. It will (1) examine 
the specific philosophies and experiences that influenced 
each man's world view; (2) analyze the conditions that affected 
each president's foreign policies; (3) study the support and 
opposition that each encountered in attempting to achieve his 
objectives; (4) enumerate the results that each hoped to 
achieve in the realm of foreign policy; and (5) explore the 
effect of each man's style upon the international community.
In order to limit the scope of this study to manageable pro­
portions, it will consider only three issues in depth: France's
role in the European Economic Community, France's view of NATO 
and its nuclear strike force, and France's relations with the 
Eastern and Western blocs.
The topic will be treated according to the follow­
ing plan. Chapter One will examine de Gaulle and his concep­
tion of France's role in the world. Chapters Two and Three 
will deal with the foreign policies of Pompidou and Giscard 
respectively. Chapter Four will offer a comparative analysis 
of the three leaders.
CHAPTER I 
De Gaulle
Charles de Gaulle was one of the most articulate 
speakers and prolific writers of the modern era and expres­
sed himself on a wide range of topics. His first hook, 
entitled Discord Among the Enemy, was published in 192^ -.
De Gaulle’s biographer, Jean Lacouture, describes his first 
work as "a very interesting little book, made up of five 
studies denouncing, one after another, the encroachments of 
military authority on the civil power in imperial Germany, 
and finding in those encroachments the fundamental reason for 
the collapse of the State at the end of 1918. Charles de 
Gaulle was to publish better books ... The ’primitive' among
f
the literary works of de Gaulle has a clarity of line, a sharp­
ness of approach, which is often lacking in the majestic orna­
mentation- -and even in the skillful omissions--of the later 
essays.
De Gaulle wrote Discard Among the Enemy while a 
prisoner of war in Ingolstadt, Germany. Seriously wounded 
on three separate occasions, he was taken prisoner after a 
close action at Douaumont on March 2, 1916. As a second 
lieutenant of the Thirty-third Infantry Regiment he wrote,
"It appeard in the wink of an eye that all the virtue in the
11
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2world could not prevail against superior firepower."
Nicknamed "the Constable" by his fellow prisoners, he spent
the next thirty-two months in five different internment camps.
De Gaulle published his second work, entitled The
Edge of the Sword, in 1932. Throughout the book he tried
to reconcile the roles of the statesman and the soldier. In
his foreword he appeared to favor the soldier.
Force has watched over civilizations in 
the cradle; force has ruled empires, and 
dug the grave of decadence; force gives 
laws to the peopls and controls their 
destinies. It is true to say that the 
fighting spirit, the art of war, the 
virtues of the soldier, are an integral 
part of man's inheritance. They have 
been part and parcel of history in all 
its phases, the medium through whi-ch it 
has expressed itself.^
It was difficult for de Gaulle to reconcile the man of force 
and action (soldier) with the man of tact and letters (states­
man) without sacrificing one to the other. He seemed per­
plexed by this dichotomy in his own personality. In the 
closing chapter of The Edge of the Sword he concluded that 
the two roles were mutually supportive. "There is no soldier 
who, by winning fame for himself, has not served the hopes 
and aims of high policy, nor any statesman who, by the great­
ness of his achievements, has not won still a greater glory
l\.
-by contributing to the defense of his country."
De Gaulle published The Army of the Future while 
still a captain in the army and an instructor at the military 
college at St. Cyr. Released in 193^> this work stressed the 
need for a career army quite unlike the conscription-based
13
popular armies of the Napoleonic era and the First World War. 
He advocated the formation of mechanized divisions that could 
travel a hundred miles a day and attack the enemy from the 
rear with close air support. The French military establish­
ment ignored his advice, placing its faith in the fixed forti­
fications of the Maginot Line. The German phenomenon of 
blitzkrieg (lightning warfare) adopted the very system that 
de Gaulle had suggested five years before. German tanks 
assisted by Stuka dive bombers swept across France in May 
19^0 in a six-week campaign that stunned the world. De 
Gaulle's work also predicted that the Germans would attack 
through the Ardennes, which according to conventional wisdom 
was unsuitable terrain for mechanized operations. His predic­
tion proved painfully accurate. The General later claimed in 
his War Memoirs that Hitler's staff had read The Army of the 
Future aloud to him in 193^-
Though the work was not well received by French 
military planners, it was recognized for its quality outside 
of France. In the foreword to an English translation of the 
book published in 19^1, editor Walter M.illis offered the 
following appraisal of de Gaulle.
But this book of Captain de Gaulle has a 
much greater importance today than that 
merely of a prediction from which others 
were to profit, of a neglected warning 
for which events were to provide a ter­
rible justification. The obscure captain 
of 193^ is now the Leader of Free France, 
the man who snatched hope, energy, and res­
olution out of the vast wreck, who raised 
the banner while others were letting it 
fall and who may yet play a large role in
14
the fate of his country and the world.
The book brilliantly etches the quality 
of mind which he brings to the task. His 
record sufficiently demonstrates his 
capacities as a man of action: the book
shows that he combines with them intel­
lectual powers to which we are, perhaps, 
too little accustomed in our own military 
men. Here are that precision and lucidity 
of thought, that ability to grasp the pro­
blem of modern warfare as a whole, backed 
by a real sense of the past, a real know­
ledge of military history and even a 
genuine literary grace, which are the  ^
glory of the French military tradition.
This glowing review, though biased, indicates that others
sensed in de Gaulle the qualities of soldier and statesman
at this early stage in his career.
De Gaulle published France and Its Army in 1938*
In the course of 277 pages, he traced the history of the
French army through various stages of development, specifically
during the ancien regime, the revolution, the Napoleonic wars,
the Franco-Prussian war, and World War I. Describing this
work in his War Memoirs, he stated: "... in it I showed how,
from century to century, the soul and fate of the country were 
constantly reflected in the mirror of its army; the final warn­
ing which, from my modest place, I addressed to my country on 
the eve of the cataclysm."
The General began writing his War Memoirs during 
the 1950's. The three volumes were subtitled The Call to 
Honor 1940-1942, Unity 1942-1944, and Salvation 1944-1946.
The first volume was published in 195^; 'the two subsequent 
tomes appeared in 1956 and 1959 respectively. The combined 
work is a substantial volume of some 1,000 pages that describes
15
de Gaulle's political, military, and symbolic roles in six 
years of French history. The War Memoirs recount and justify 
his participation in the battle of France, the establishment 
of Free France, the campaign in Africa, the invasion of Nor­
mandy, the liberation, the provisional government, and the 
birth of the Fourth Republic.
After his defeat in the referendum of April 27,
1969, de Gaulle retired from public life to finish his memoirs. 
He intended to publish a second trilogy, entitled Memoirs of 
Hope, to record the period 1958-1969. The series was to con­
sist of the following volumes: Renewal 1958-1962, Effort
1962-1965, and Term 1966-1969. The author lived to finish 
the first volume and two chapters of the second. The series 
ends, therefore, with the spring of 1963.
There exists a wealth of primary sources about de 
Gaulle. All his speeches have been preserved, including his 
BBC address of June 18, 1940, his Bayeux speech of June 16, 
1946, and numerous statements and press releases from the 
Fifth Republic. Some of de Gaulle's conversations also have 
survived. His associate Andr<£ Malraux published a book
7entitled Felled Oaks: Conversations with de Gaulle in 1972.
De Gaulle's Concent of his Role in History
There is a perennial argument among scholars over 
whether history brings forth men of destiny or men of destiny 
make history. Certain individuals when confronted with criti­
cal situations prove to be great leaders: Lincoln, Roosevelt,
and Churchill fit this mold. Other men are associated with 
entire eras: Alexander the Great, Julius Ceasar, and Louis XIV
16
are examples. There is a third category which encompasses 
both of the preceding types: this is the man with resources
of mind and character, who is both a product and a symbol of 
his times. Charles de Gaulle was such a man. He possessed 
a flair for the dramatic that impelled him to participate in 
the affairs of the world. After serving an apprenticeship 
that lasted half a century, he was equipped to attempt to 
shape history to his own ends.
He was imbued with a sense of mission. In the first 
page of his War Memoirs, he stated that the notionns of histo­
rical France and greatness was inseparable. He served his 
apprenticeship as an army officer, resistance leader, head 
of the, provisional government, and political figure. In 1958* 
at the age of 67, he was called upon to extricate France from 
political, military, and economic chaos. During the first 
decade of the Fifth Republic, he set out to restore France's 
greatness.
In The Edge of the Sword (1932) de Gaulle describes 
the process by which certain men become in history. Their 
desire to serve leads to train for the future. They must 
possess a certain flair, intelligence, and eagerness to parti­
cipate that encourage the development of ability and strength 
of character. According to de Gaulle, nothing great will ever 
be achieved without great men, and men are only great if they 
are determined to be so. As examples, he cites the British 
Prime Minister Disraeli and the French Marshal Foch. The 
author maintains that Disraeli taught himself to think like
17
a prime minister in his youth, and that Foch demonstrated his 
potential as a commander-in-chief while he was an obscure
g
instructor. De Gaulle wrote these words while he himself 
was an obscure instructor.
The author then describes the second phase, in which 
the trained man influences the course of events. For de Gaulle 
this required a certain inspiration. He notes that amtitious 
young men, especially those of high rank, should exhibit en­
thusiasm if not an obsession for leaving their mark on events. 
In his stilted prose, he asserts that "from the shore on which
they live their uneventful lives, they should direct their
9
eyes to the stormy seas of History!
De Gaulle's prescription for greatness also entailed 
a willingness to accept isolation. In The Edge of the Sword, 
his description of the leader foreshadowed the imperious per­
sonality that would emerge as "The General." He wrote that 
"the man of character ... is inevitably aloof, for there can 
be no authority without prestige, nor prestige unless he 
keeps his distance."^0 This aspect of de Gaulle's character 
prompted biographer Jean Lacouture to describe him as "Charles 
the Alone. De Gaule was ever conscious of his role in
world history. The following summary seeks to examine this 
role.
Historical Summary
French foreign policy after World War II was con­
cerned primarily with three issues: decolonization, the
political and economic reconstruction of Europe, and the 
re-establishment of France as a world power. The surrender
of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 195^ sounded the 
death knell for French hegemony in Southeast Asia. Morocco 
and Tunisia were granted independence in 1956. The war in 
Algeria, which erupted on November 1, 195^» seemed to defy 
solution. Germany's entry into NATO was approved in 195^» 
and France joined the EEC in 1957* Though the Franco-Soviet 
Pact of 1 9 ^  had solidified relations between Paris and 
Moscow, France continued to pursue a policy of non-alignment 
with either the Soviet bloc or the Western alliance. France's 
NATO commitment was its only contribution to the collective 
security of Western Europe.
By 1958 France's involvement in Algeria had deepened
and the possibility of civil war in France further aggravated
the situation. French generals in Algiers were fomenting
open rebellion, which accentuated the need for a strong leader
On May 13, 1958» extremists in Algiers forced the government
to a showdown, and Premier Pierre Pflimlin and President Rene
Coty turned to General de Gaulle. The National Assembly
approved de Gaulle as premier on June 1, 1958, by a vote of 
12329 to The General then dissolved parliament, and a
majority of the electoral college subsequently confirmed his 
appointment as chief executive.
A new constitution, which accorded the president 
sweeping powers, went into effect on October 4 after being 
ratified by the French electorate. Article Five of the con­
stitution grants the president internal and external powers. 
Article Eight specifies that the president appoints the prime
minister and "on proposal of the premier, he appoints other 
members of the government." The president's military powers 
are defined in Article Fifteen. "The president is chief of 
the armies. He presides over the high councils and commit­
tees of national defense." Article Fifty-two prescribes that 
"the president of the republic negotiates and ratifies treat­
ies." Thus, in the Fifth Republic, the president is chief 
of state, responsible for all cabinet appointments, commander 
in chief of the armed forces, and chief diplomatic negotiator 
One analyst has noted that "the constitution evolved through­
out the Gaullist period--and ... during Pompidou's presidency
13in the direction of presidential.dominance." ^
The constitution also provides for specific emer­
gency powers. Article Sixteen allows the president to invoke 
these powers in time of crisis after "consultation with the 
premier, the presidents of the assemblies, and the constitu­
tional council." Though required by law to consult with 
government leaders, the president is not bound by their advic 
He may therefore become the sole decision-maker by invoking 
the emergency powers. De Gaulle exercised this prerogative 
only once, from April 23 until September 29, 1961, in respons 
to the Generals' Revolt in Algeria. On April 22, 1961, 
Generals Challe, Salan, Zeller, and Jouhaud mutinied, threat­
ening to drop paratroopers at Orly and overthrow the govern- 
1Ament. The General invoked the emergency powers for a five- 
month period in order to subvert the efforts of the Organiza­
tion of the Secret Army (OAS), which sought to depose him.
20
There were several unsuccessful attempts on de Gaulle's 
life during this period.
Article Thirty-eight grants the president the power 
"to issue ordinances, for a limited period, concerning mat­
ters that are normally in the domain of laws." The general 
issued several such executive decrees during the summer of 
1961.
Article Eleven allows the president to "submit to 
referendum any government bill ... which, without being con­
trary to the constitution, would have implications for the 
functioning of institutions," De Gaulle used this power five 
times. Just over 53 percent of the French people voted 
against this final measure. Having staked his tenure in 
office on support for this issue, de Gaulle resigned from 
the presidency immediately.
The three powers— to declare a state of emergency, 
to issue decrees that have the force of law, and to call for 
referenda--give the president near dictatorial authority. 
Inherent in these articles was de Gaulle's desire to bypass 
the National Assembly, to invoke executive priviledge, and 
to appeal directly to the people. These provisions reflected 
de Gaulle's basic distrust of deputies and the legislature 
and his wish to reserve ultimate power for the executive.
Louis XIV's famous dictum "I am the state" found 
its twentieth-century counterpart in the words of Charles de 
Gaulle. Speaking to General Salan, supreme commander of the 
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have remarked, "I am the minister of Algeria."1-^ In his
War Memoirs de Gaulle repeatedly asserted that he was the
personification of France during the Nazi occupation. In a
radio "broadcast on June 18, 19^ +0 from the. BBC in London, the
General exhorted his fellow countrymen neither to assume the
mantle of defeat nor to abandon the struggle.
But has the last word been said? Must we 
abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and 
irremediable? To these questions I answer-- 
N0!
Speaking in full knowledge of the facts, I 
ask you to believe me when I say that the 
cause of France is not lost. The very 
factors that brought about our defeat may 
one day lead us to victory.16
These words prompted thousands of Frenchmen to 
cross the English Channel and join de Gaulle’s Free French 
movement or to join the resistance in France. As leader of 
the organized effort the General symbolized Free France during 
the four years of occupation. It was to this man, who was the 
embodiment of tradition, that the Fourth Republic turned in 
1958. It comes as no surprise that de Gaulle assumed a great 
deal of power after being elected president of the Fifth 
Republic.
De Gaulle's program for dealing with Algeria con­
sisted of four parts: (l) France embarked upon a major pro­
gram of economic development, which Included a $200 million 
annual investment in the production of Sahara oil; (2) counter- 
insurgency efforts were expanded, as conscripts and special 
guerrilla units arrived from the mainland; (3) social changes 
more all-encompassing than those proposed by Guy Mollet's
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Republican Front in 1956, including the enfranchisement of
women, were implemented; and (^) a sustained effort was made
to enlist international support for the French cause, and to
17keep the United Nations out of the conflict. (
When his program failed to satisfy the FLN, de
Gaulle began to consider the alternatives. These included a
sovereignty-association arrangement, very similar to that
which the Quebec separatists have proposed to the Canadian
government, which would maintain economic ties but sever
1 Rexisting political bonds. Two other distinct possibilities 
were outright secession and self-determination. De Gaulle 
decided that French prestige would benefit by granting self- 
determination and would suffer by contesting the right of 
secession. He therefore proposed Algerian independence in 
the spring of 1962. The Evian Accords were signed on February 
21, 1962, implemented on March 19, 1962, and ratified by popu­
lar referendum in metropolitan France on April 8, 1962. ^
The Algerian conflict was one of the bloodiest in 
French history. It is estimated that as many as one million 
Muslims died in the fighting, and French casualities are esti­
mated at 27,000 killed and 65,000 wounded. After the war, 
the French officer corps returned to France along with some
^00,000 draftees and approximately one million French citizens 
20of Algeria. For the first time m  more than twenty years, 
French soldiers were not dying overseas.
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Although de Gaulle focused his attention on Algeria 
between 1958 and 1962, he also concentrated on France's East- 
West relations. One scholar has identified three distinct 
periods of interaction between France and the superpowers 
under de Gaulle: 1958-62, 1963-68, and 1968-69. ^  Between
1958 and 1962, American dominance of the Atlantic alliance 
frustrated de Gaulle. He tended to favor the Soviet Union 
in his relations with the superpowers, particularly as the 
strategic balance shifted toward the United States after the 
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. The period 1963 to 
1968 is noteworthy for France's independence of both blocs, 
but especially of the West. Three incidents illustrate this 
change. On January 4, 1963» de Gaulle rejected Kennedy's 
proposal for a multilateral nuclear force consisting of the 
United States, Britain and France. He also vetoed Britain's 
bid to enter the European Economic Community (EEC) on Januar 
14, 1963* His most dramatic gesture was France's withdrawal 
from NATO in 1966. The final period, 1968 and 1969, saw 
France gravitate toward the West once again. One analyst 
has noted that de Gaulle's "opening to the east" ended 
abruptly when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in
1 9 6 8 .22
Perhaps the most perplexing of de Gaulle's foreign 
policy decisions was his withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance. 
On March 10-11, 1966, he sent a memorandum to the NATO allies 
announcing his intention to expel foreign troops from French 
soil, to dismantle certain installations and military bases
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belonging to foreign powers, and to disengage the French 
military from active participation in the alliance. He had 
previously refused to allow NATO to stockpile nuclear wea­
pons in France, had prevented the emplacement of intermediate- 
range ballistic missile silos on French soil, and had forced 
tactical wings of NATO fighter-bombers to find bases in 
Germany rather than in France. The French fleet had disen­
gaged from NATO maneuvers as early as June 21, 1963. In 
retrospect, Professor Edward Kolodziej considers de Gaulle's
announcement of March 10, 1966 more a natural culmination of
23events than a departure from past policy.  ^ Jean Lacouture 
agrees.
The assault on NATO began in February 1966.
Nothing could have been more foreseeable.
In many respects it was a gesture that 
gave expression to all of the deepest 
impulses and prejudices on which his 
diplomacy is based? cynicism and 
ruthlessness in the relations between 
states (even so-called friendly states); 
supremacy of national sovereignty over 
any ideological concept of alliance;
France's standing among nations. But 
however typical it was of Gaullist 
diplomacy, the gesture--being so tough, 
so abrupt, so challenging--succeeded in 
taking everyone by s u r p r i s e . 24
As a final gesture the General even restricted the number of
NATO flights allowed in French air space. His policy toward
the Atlantic alliance aimed to decrease French participation
in regional security arrangements and to further France's
independence.
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French nuclear policy, which is based upon de 
Gaulle's nuclear strike force, illustrates his notion of 
independence. On September 17> 1958, de Gaulle addressed 
a memorandum to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Mac­
Millan, and NATO Secretary General Henry Spaak stating that 
it was not the intention of France to limit its foreign policy 
within "the confines of NATO."^ He proposed the establish­
ment of a London-Paris-Washington "directorate" to replace 
American leadership of the organization. Each of the three 
powers would be able to veto the decisions of the others; 
unanimity was thus required. Each power would assume respon­
sibility for a specific sphere of influence in the Western 
world. Paris, naturally, claimed North Africa. The directo­
rate would formulate a joint military and political strategy, 
create allied commands around the globe, and conduct strategy 
deliberations on the employment of nuclear weapons.
Eisenhower rejected the proposal outright, prompting 
an incensed de Gaulle to announce that France had no choice
but to steer an independent course. France exploded its first
2 6atomic bomb in the Sahara desert on February 13» I960.
De Gaulle then ambitiously embarked upon the construction of
sixty-two Mirage IY bombers, each of which was designed to
carry a sixty-kiloton weapon with three times the destructive
27power of the bobm dropped on Hiroshima. ( By 1968 France had 
build thirty-six of the bombers, which together carried wea­
pons with the destructive equivalent of one Minuteman II 
intercontinental ballistic missile. One disadvantage of the
Mirage IV bomber was that in order to strike the Soviet Union
it had to refuel in mid-flight somewhere over Poland. One
critic has noted that de Gaulle underestimated the technical
problems involved in developing the nuclear strike force,
2 8while overestimating France's ability to finance it.
Subsequent generations of French nuclear weaponry 
have included a surface-to-surface missile capable of deliv­
ering a 2^0-kiloton warhead at a range of 1,800 to 2,000 miles 
These missiles are located in concrete silos in the Albian 
plateau of Haute Provence in southern France. France also 
introduced two nuclear submarines to its fleet in 1972.
These submarines together carried thirty-two missiles with a
29capacity of 500 kilotons each and a range of 2,000 miles. 
(Note: a one kiloton weapon has the destructive power of
1,000 tons of dynamite; thermonuclear weapons have the added 
destructive force of blast, which is the heat released in 
nuclear fission.)
Observers have cited various reasons for de 
Gaulle's apparent obsession with an independent nuclear 
strike force. Perhaps he intended to boost the morale of 
the army afterthe losses in Indochina and Algeria, or to 
restore public confidence in the nation's ability to defend 
itself, De Gaulle believed that nuclear weaponry was the 
great equalizer among nation-states; the nuclear strike force 
satisfied his notion of grandeur. Also, because he never 
believed that the Americans would use nuclear weapons except 
in defense of their own territory, the nuclear strike force 
satisfied his desire for security and a credible French 
deterrent.^
De Gaulle refused to sign any accord designed to
prevent the dissemination and development of nuclear weapons.
On August 5, 1963* more than one hundred nations signed the
nuclear test ban treaty, which was sponsored by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. The treaty
called for a moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere,
in outer space, and underwater. It placed no restrictions on
underground testing, however. Neither Communist China nor
France participated in the agreement. De Gaulle believed
that by acquiescing to the demands of his allies he would
31relegate France to the status of a second-rate power.
De Gaulle's dream of a strong Europe that woud com­
pensate for the superpowers led him to propose a loose poli­
tical alliance within the Common Market. Christian Fouchet, 
the French ambassador to Denmark, presented the plan to a 
meeting of "The Six" in July 1961. Another de Gaulle trial 
balloon, the Fouchet plan consisted of the following proposals 
political union of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, and West Germany; formation of a joint council 
of foreign ministers; cooperation in cultural, educational, 
and scientific matters; and a legal union of European peoples. 
"The Six" debated the proposals individually and approved 
parts of them; they rejected the plan as a whole, however. 
France's trading partners found the idea of a council of 
foreign ministers particularly objectionable. None of the 
delegates favored the prospect of answering to de Gaulle in 
matters of foreign policy. The French president attempted to
29
coat the hitter pill with attractive concessions in the form
of cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation, but
his vision of a European bloc united before the superpowers
32never materialized.
De Gaulle could be just as contentious as his Com­
mon Market partners, especially in the matter of Britain's 
application for membership in the EEC. There were two main 
reasons for France's reluctance to admit the British to the 
community: Britain seemed unwilling to relinquish its
special relationship with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 
and it was particularly sensitive to the higher prices that 
prevailed in the European market as compared to the world 
market. In de Gaulle's view, Britain wanted to have its 
cake and eat it too. Why should he allow the British to 
expand their market by 300 million people, unless they were 
willing to sacrifice their lucrative economic ties with the 
Commonwealth countries and accept European market prices 
without complaint? There was no reason for admitting Britain 
because, in de Gaulle's view, the British were no more Euro­
pean than the Americans. The General vetoed Britain's bid 
for entry on January 14, 1963. ^  That evening he defended 
his action with the following statement. "It is quite pos­
sible that one day England will be metamorphosed sufficiently 
to join the European community without restrictions or reser­
vations ... It is also possible that England will not change, 
and the feeling that this is what will happen seems to be the 
outcome of the very lengthly conversations in Brussels."
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The Dutch and some other members of the EEC had 
favored British membership all along. J Prospects for the 
British case improved during the mid-sixties, especially 
after Britain distanced itself from American policies in the 
Dominican Republic and Vietnam. On May 11, 19&7» Britain 
re-submitted its proposal to join the EEC. Again de Gaulle 
shelved the idea, which was not reconsidered until December 
1969 under Pompidou. ^
It is a fallacy to assume that de Gaulle opposed
o o
European integration. Typically, though, he wanted it on 
his own terms or not at all. De Gaulle's vision differed 
from the European model of Jean Monnet, for example, in its 
essentials. De Gaulle favored a loosely-knit union of 
nation-states with converging interests, whereas Monnet pre­
ferred cooperation on an institutional level. ^  De Gaulle 
based his entire world view upon the primacy of the nation­
state; Monnet considered the nation-state obsolete and unable
AOto cope with complex international issues. De Gaulle 
jealously guarded French sovereignty against encroachment by 
any regional organization, but Monnet believed that European 
integration only could be achieved through such organizations 
such as the European Economic Community, the European Coal
and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, and
Ai . .Euratom. Finally, de Gaulle sought to use a unified
Europe to enhance French prestige: by allying with the Third
World, Europe could offset the influence of the superpowers.
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LoThis was not what Jean Monnet had m  mind. De Gaulle had 
a confederal notion of European unity based on the nation­
state; Monnet had a federal notion based on a European
Ll'i . .
Parliament.  ^ The two points of view were irreconcilable.
In an appraisal of de Gaulle's presidency, one
critic has characterized him as preoccupied with foreign
affairs to the virtual exclusion of domestic issues.
In other countries, and especially in 
Britain and the. United States, public 
opinion has so identified France with 
de Gaulle and his foreign policies 
that the rest of the complex French 
scene has tended to pass unnoticed.
But de Gaulle is not typical of 
modern France. He has not been greatly 
interested in domestic affairs and has 
had little direct influence on them 
between 1958 a'nd 1968 save to provide 
continuity of government. Only in 
rare moments of crises, like that 
which forced itself upon him in May 
1968, will he descend from the heights 
to pay much attention to the desires of 
the mass French public.^
It is useful to 'examine the domestic situation in France
during de Gaulle's presidency in order to understand the
reasons for his departure.
During his first four years in office de Gaulle
enjoyed a period of relative popularity that reached its
zenith in April 1962, when 90 percent of the French electorate
approved his decision to grant Algerian independence. The
General encountered his first major opposition on October 5>
1962, when the Chamber of Deputies gave his premier a vote
of no confidence over the issue of direct popular election
of the president. De Gaulle dissolved parliament and called
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for new legislative elections to take place as soon as a 
referendum had resolved the dispute. The voters approved 
de Gaulle's proposal .hy an overwhelming 62.25 percent of 
the vote on October 28, 1962.^ In the subsequent legisla­
tive elections, the Gaullists returned 228 deputies to the 
National Assembly. The vote of no confidence actually 
resulted in an increase in Gaullist strength in parliament. 
Once again de Gaulle had employed the instrument of the 
popular referendum to his advantage.
The General did not fare as well in the presidential 
elections of December 1965* There was an unusually high turn­
out (84.75 percent of all registered voters) for the first 
ballot, of which de Gaulle won 44.64 percent with 10,828,523 
votes. The Socialist Francois Mitterrand received 31*72 per­
cent with 7>694,003 votes. Jean Lecanuet, the candidate of
the center, received 15*57 percent of the vote and three dif-
46ferent candidates split the remaining ten percent. The 
returns troubled de Gaulle. During the two weeks between 
the first ballot and the run-off election, Premier Pompidou 
orchestrated an impressive campaign to woo marginal supporters 
back into the Gaullist camp. The effort proved successful. 
Voter turnout was high on December 19 as well, with 84.33 
percent of registered voters participating. De Gaulle won
55.19 percent of the second ballot, with 13,083,699 votes. 
Mitterrand ran a distant second, with 36.74 percent or 
10,619,735 votes.^
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After 1965 de Gaulle's domestic base deteriorated
rapidly. The nation experienced labor strikes, union unrest,
unemployment, and inflation. In the legislative elections
of 1967 the Gaullists lost their parliamentary majority for
the first time and depended on the support of Giscard d*
A 8
Estaing's Independent Republicans. The final breakdown 
occurred during the student riots of May 1968. De Gaulle 
left Paris at the height of the demonstrations for a state 
visit to Rumania, leaving Premier Pompidou to handle the 
rapidly escalating crisis. The General was furious when he' 
returned to find the Sorbonne occupied by student militants, 
barricades in the streets, and the situation worsening by 
the minute. De Gaulle blamed most of this on Pompidou.
On May 2k, 1968, the General appeared on national 
television to appeal directly to the people for support. The 
78-year-old president, obviously shaken and weary, did not 
project the commanding presence of June 18, 19^0. His old 
charm appeared to have failed him.
Giscard and his Independent Republicans openly 
opposed de Gaulle in the referendum of April 27, 1969, which 
proposed regional reform and reorganization of the Senate. 
Realizing the possible consequences of his action, the General 
left a two-line message at the Elysee Palace for use in case 
his initiative failed. The message was simple and direct.
"I am ceasing to exercise my functions as president of the 
republic. This decision will take effect today at midnight." 
He then returned to his home at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises to 
awai the results of the referendum.
3^
It is ironic that a domestic issue was responsi­
ble for de Gaulle’s resignation. In a conversation with de 
Gaulle after the referendum, Andri Malraux asked, "Why did 
you leave on a question as secondary as that of the regions?" 
"Because of the absurdity," replied de Gaulle.
One analyst has observed that "the May events 
amounted to an unscheduled referendum on ten years of Gaullist 
rule."^1 This statement helps explain the results of the ref­
erendum held the following year. The French electorate was 
ready for a change, and the referendum provided them an oppor­
tunity to vent their frustrations. The General settled in to 
write his second set of memoirs. He did at home on Monday, 
November 9» 1970.
Charles de Gaulle' s View of the World
Charles de Gaulle’s world view was based fundamentally 
on the notion of the supremacy of the nation-state over ideo­
logy. He believed that the nation-state (the nation being 
the people and the state their institutions) would survive
any historical challenge by an ideology, particularly Marxism.
<2De Gaulle thought Marx's "masses" did not exist. He
believed that, in the final analysis, the people would obey
and support only the nation-state. ^ One analyst has summarized
de Gaulle's philosophy as follows.
General de Gaulle's foreign policy is con­
structed on a foundation of three major 
ideas. France must occupy a place in the 
front rank of nations. Relations between 
states--whether allied or not--are based on 
power and guile. Ideologies are of rela­
tively little importance, and the only real 
forces confronting each other in the inter­
national arena are individual nations.
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De Gaulle himself expressed it best in his classic statement:
"A state worthy of the name has no friends.'*-^
In de Gaulle's international order, there were four 
groups (ensembles) of states. The first group comprised those 
states under the influence of the United States, especially 
Canada and Great Britain. . The second included Western Europe, 
in particular those states that constituted the Common Market. 
Great Britain was excluded from this grouping because of its 
special economic and military relationship with the United 
States. The third ensemble consisted of those nations aligned 
with the Soviet Union, particularly Eastern Europe and Cuba.
The fourth group included all the so-called non-aligned devel­
oping countries, especially China and the Third World.
In de Gaulle's view, the international system estab­
lished at the Yalta Conference, to which de Gaulle was not 
invited, was illegitimate and unstable. In order to restore 
the system to equilibrium, several events had to take place. 
First, the United States must withdraw its conventional forces 
from Europe, leaving its nuclear umbrella intact. Then, France 
could negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany by 
playing on the Soviet desire to stabilize its western frontier 
and strengthen its defenses along the Chinese border. This 
move would establish a "European entente from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. De Gaulle's scheme seems unrealistic at best,
even to an impartial observer. Because de Gaulle considered 
Russia tied by geography, history, and race to Europe, he 
included it in his "Atlantic to the Urals" definition of Europe. 
"Russia, for all its deviationalist ideology, authoritarian
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regime, and expansionist pretensions, remained European and 
ultimately could be assimilated, de Gaulle felt, within his 
world view." His definition of Europe did not include 
Britain, however.
The de Gaulle Style
A close examination of Charles de Gaulle's treatment 
of problems in French foreign policy reveals few clearly dis­
cernible patterns of behavior. The French leader was unpre­
dictable. In order to appreciate Gaullist foreign polity, it 
Is necessary to understand the man. In the words of one French 
historian, "It seems somewhat arbitrary to determine what is 
Gaullist and what is not in politics ... because de Gaulle 
himself often changed his mind." To attempt to define 
Gaullist foreign policy is no easy task; Gaullism was quite 
often whatever General de Gaulle decreed it to be. Another 
observer has summed up the de Gaulle style as follows.
Everything was thus made crystal clear: 
de Gaulle alone would handle foreign 
policy and it would be his policy. He 
did so cautiously until the referendum 
in October 1962. After that he grew 
increasingly daring: he throttled the
opposition. Parliament no longer delib­
erated on the major foreign policy 
options. It debated academically the 
consequences of the chief of state's 
unilateral decisions. The Council of 
Ministers was informed % posteriori■
Georges Pompidou acknowledged that only 
three ministers had prior knowledge of 
the decision to withdraw from NATO.
Going over the heads of the intermediary 
bodies, de Gaulle announced his decisions 
to the French people and presented his 
comments to the press.59
37
De Gaulle's style in dealing with allies was as
frustrating as it was effective. He often employed the
politics of the empty chair at conferences and negotiations.
This gesture was intended to detract from the legitimacy of
the proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important
partner. The advantage of this tactice was that de Gaulle
could indignantly announce to the world that neither he nor
his representatives had been consulted on an issue,: and that
therefore any agreements concluded were not binding on the
French people. When not openly- boycotting an assembly,
French delegates often employed the tactic of frontal assault
against the most powerful ally present, usually the United
States. This ploy of opposition for its own sake became known
as the politics of "no," which de Gaulle and his envoys prac-
6 0ticed with great success among enemies and allies alike.
Jean Lacouture has noted that "until his challenge to NATO
in 1966, Gaullist diplomacy— that mixture of effervescent
swagger, icy realism, and generosity--was a tradition which
6lno Frenchman could disown without being unduly cynical."
Survey research indicates that de Gaulle's attack 
on NATO strengthened rather than weakened his position among
62his followers. The withdrawal from NATO is a classic exam­
ple of the politics of "no" and the politics of the empty 
chair.
The most obvious factor influencing de Gaulle's 
presidential style was his military background. He had com­
manded the Fourth Armored Division during the Battle of France,
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leading counterattacks against the cities of Laon and
/T o
Abbeville. ^ He knew the true face of war, including re­
treat, defeat and humiliation. The measure of a man is not 
how he handles success, but how he handles failure. De 
Gaulle learned early that effort is only rewarded when it 
is crowned by success. There is no doubt that his military 
experiences exerted considerable influence over his presiden­
tial style. De Gaulle remained "the General" until his 
dying day.
As The Edge of the Sword suggested, de Gaulle con­
sidered the roles of statesman and soldier perfectly compat­
ible: each contributed to the overall welfare of the nation.
Each entailed a certain distance from the people; de Gaulle 
was fully aware that this distance was necessary to preserve 
his mystique. The familiar image of the General striding down 
the Champs-Elysee after the liberation of Paris in August 19^4 
remained indelibly imprinted upon the memories of a generation 
of Frenchmen. The General was in a class by himself, and he 
deliberatly cultivated the image of being different than the 
average mortal. This is one reason why he refused to parti­
cipate in postwar partisan politics. He believed that domestic 
politics were beneath a man of his stature; to enter the poli­
tical arena would deprive him of the main advantage he enjoyed 
over other leaders--his mystique. Rather than invite compari­
son with other men, de Gaulle chose to depart from the poli­
tical scene in 19^6. By divorcing himself from the activities 
of the Fourth Republic, he preserved his districtiveness and 
became the only attractive political alternative in 1958.
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De Gaulle made a conscious effort to identify himself as a 
military hero and a retired statesman rather than a politi­
cian. He groomed himself for public office on his own terms 
and bided his time patiently.
It is no coincidence that a military crisis brought 
de Gaulle to power. The Algerian dilemma transcended partisan 
politics; it required a solution that was acceptable to the 
government, the army, and the people. Algeria pitted a reb­
ellious army against an ineffective government, and it was 
soon apparent that the army had the upper hand. De Gaulle 
met the needs of France in 1958 perfectly. He was a military 
man who could deal with the generals in Africa, but he was 
also a statesman with the best interests of France at heart.
His reputation as a soldier and statesman made him the obvious 
choice for premier and for president. De Gaulle rode on over­
seas policy question rather than a domestic issue into office; 
this would set the tone for his presidential style.
From the start, de Gaulle spurned domestic political 
structures and politicians in carrying out his Algerian policy. 
The constitution of the Fifth Republic established executive 
primary in foreign affairs at the expense of the legislature.
De Gaulle's use of popular referenda to decide issues reflected 
his plebiscitarian concept of government. He viewed politicians 
as the representatives of special interests who could not be 
trusted to protect the national interest. The people were 
sovereign; only they could decide what was best for France.
^0
Before submitting issues to referendum, de Gaulle 
tried to gauge the mood of the electorate. Those issues 
that he believed would pass were brought before the forum 
of -popular opinion; more controversial issues were shelved 
or solved behind the scenes. During his honeymoon period 
with the French electorate between 1958 and 1962, the voters 
approved all four of the initiatives he proposed.
The resolution of the Algerian crisis in 1962 
caused a shift in de Gaulle's support. The regular army 
returned to metropolitan France. For the first time since 
19^0, the French army was not fighting an overseas war.
French society assimilated returning residents of Algeria 
with relative ease, especially along the Meditteranean coast. 
The Gaullist Union for the New Republic made impressive gains 
in the National Assembly. The year 1962 marked the high tide 
of de Gaulle's popularity.
At peace for the first time in twenty-two years, 
Frenchmen seemed to become more introspective. After Algeria 
de Gaulle's image began to suffer. His poor showing on the 
first ballot of the presidential election of 1965» the Gaullist 
losses in the legislative elections of 1967> the student riots 
in 1968, and his final defeat in the referendum of 1969 all 
serve to illustrate the gradual erosion of his base of support. 
As France turned its political gaze inward, de Gaulle's for­
tunes declined. Though the army and parliament opposed him 
initially, he managed to appease the former and neutralize
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the latter. A majority of voters approved his policies in 
the beginning, but the same majority repudiated him in 1969-
Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy may be summarized 
briefly: he wanted a powerful, prestigious, independent
France. In trying to accomplish these objectives, he pur­
sued policies that were opportunistic and unpredictable.
Bowing to the political exigencies of the times* and acknow­
ledging colonialism as a relic of the p'ast, he freed Algeria. 
One analyst has remarked that de Gaulle sacrificed Algeria on 
the altar of French prestige and grandeur. De Gaulle always 
had the interests of France in mind; had he sought a military 
solution to the Algerian problem, he would have weakened France 
militarily, economically, and in terms of international pres­
tige. By granting Algerian independence, he avoided prolonging 
the agony.
De Gaulle did not succeed in his goal of making 
France a world power. Even with its nuclear strike force, 
France is at best a second-rate power in the modern world.
De Gaulle's detractors have argued that his - delusions of 
grandeur caused him to squander billions of francs on nuclear 
armaments, money that could have been better invested in 
France's domestic economy.
The General did manage to avoid affiliation with 
either superpower bloc. He tried to maintain a strategic 
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. For 
example, he opposed the American presence in Southeast Asia, 
and protested when President Johnson sent the Marines into
k2
Santa Domingo in 1965. He also opposed the Soviet threat to
Berlin in 19^8, and criticized the Soviets throughout the
Cuban missile cirsis in 1962.
De Gaulle’s love-hate relationship with the Western
allies clearly illustrates his unpredictable nature. His
anti-Israeli policy was particularly unpopular in Washington.
France began to disengage itself from Israel after the 1967
Six-Day War.^ On June 2, 1967 > two days after the outbreak
of the war, de Gaulle halted the sale of Mirage fighter-bombers
to the Israelis, though he continued to allow the shipment of
war material, including helicopters and gunboats. An Israeli
commando raid on Beirut airport on December 28, 1968, provoked
66de Gaulle's wrath. He announced a total embargo of Israel.
De Gaulle's critics have argued that his compaign
to exclude Britain from the EEC may have been in retaliation
for the rough treatment he received in London between 19^0
and 19^. His intransigence toward Britain is often cited as
evidence of his inability to forget the inustices of the past.
Yet this same man effected a historic rapprochment with
Chancellor Conrad Adenauer of Germany in 1962-63. De Gaulle
was well received in Germany, where he charmed audiences with
speeches delivered in German. He had learned the language well
during his three years as a prisoner during World War I.
Similarly, critics have traced de Gaulle's strained
relations with the United States to his non-too-cordial rela-
6 7tionship with President Roosevelt during World War II.
This explanation is too simplistic to merit serious consid­
eration. Simply stated, the French president was unpredict­
able .
Conclusions
(1) De Gaulle's experiences as an army officer molded his 
world view. A man of action, he disliked ponderous institu­
tions like the National Assembly. He avoided participation 
in partisan politics, preferring "man of the hour" situations
(2) The Fifth Republic was born of a foreign crisis. After 
1962, domestic conditions contributed to de Gaulle's downfall
(3) The French people supported de Gaulle in four referenda 
held between 1958 and 1962. After Algeria, his base of sup­
port withered.
(A) The General achieved his objectives of power, prestige, 
and independence only partially. The nuclear strike force 
is a vestige of his desire for all three.
(5) General de Gaulle's style recalls a vivid image of the 
man to this day. But arrogance is not the stuff of which 
alliances are made. De Gaulle tended to alienate rather than 
appease, to confront rather than cooperate. For this his 
critics will never forgive him. There is no doubt that he 
was a product of the past, perhaps even an anachronism, but 
he was always a unique personality.
CHAPTER II 
Pompidou
At first glance, Georges Pompidou does not seem
the type of man to become president of France. For two
decades, he lived in the shadow of his mentor, Charles de
Gaulle, serving as the Generalfs inconspicuous aide-de-camp.
Pompidou dealt with matters that de Gaulle considered
"housekeeping11, such as financing the campaigns of the
struggling Gaullist parties. In the legislative elections
of 1951» "the Rally of the French People (RFP) managed to win
21.20 percent of the popular vote on the first ballot, largely
through the efforts of Pompidou. Again in November 1958*
the Union for the New Republic (UNR) won 20 percent of the
vote in the legislative elections. The General, always
aloof from party politics, did not participate in either 
1campaign.
As president, de Gaulle concerned himself with 
prestigious matters of state, while his second-in-command 
kept his political house in order. Pompidou was on a first- 
name basis with more Gaullist deputies than the General 
admitted to knowing, and he kept political in-fighting to 
a minimum. By scratching backs and smoothing ruffled 
feathers, Pompidou helped steer the Gaullist majority along
AA
5^the path desired hy its leader, and helped mold it into a 
cohesive and effective governing body. De Gaulle disdain­
fully referred to the National Assembly as Mthe kitchen"
2
and to politics as "the soup." Georges Pompidou kept the
lid on the boiling kettle.
A schrewd businessman and intimate of France's 
distinguished Rothschild family, Pompidou was at ease in the 
financial world. During the General's postwar exile from 
politics, Pompidou served as a director of the Rothschild 
bank. The business contracts he cultivated during this per­
iod proved invaluable when de Gaulle asked him to return to 
the Elysee Palace in 1958 as chief of staff. Four years 
later de Gaulle appointed Pompidou premier, a position that 
he held until the General dismissed him in 1968. Pompidou's 
tenure at the Hotel Matignon signaled a new phase in the de 
Gaulle era: his status as de Gaulle's right-hand man was
official and sanctioned by law. It became increasingly ap­
parent that the General was grooming Pompidou as his successor. 
After 1965 Pompidou campaigned for the presidency, first dis­
creetly, then openly, and his election to office in 1969 
proved a natural culmination of events. Pompidou's success 
story is an interesting one, considering that the man was by 
temperament more an administrator than a politician. One 
author has called Pompidou's meteoric rise to power "the 
Pompidou enigma," which he described as follows.
^6
Judging by appearances, Georges Pompidou 
advanced in life as if on a cushion of 
air. Doors opened before him. His career 
was spectular. He was admitted to 1 1Ecole 
Normale Sunerieure without much effort on 
his part. He graduated first in his class 
with the regrets of the examining board: 
it was he who had worked the least. As 
a professor, he wanted to do something 
else, to participate in the excitement 
of the liberation. A friend introduced 
him to General de Gaulle’s staff. Another 
friend directed him to the Council of State.
He knew nothing about law. Two years later, 
his colleagues, named him secretary general 
of their organization. De Gaulle asked 
Pompidou to work closely with him: soon
Pompidou was the grand old man of the RPF.
A chance acquaintance introduced him to 
the Rothschilds. He did not know a bill 
from a promissory note, k Soon he was 
director general at Rothschild. It wasn’t 
yet the thirteenth of May (1958). The 
General wanted to appoint him director of 
his cabinet, a sort of vice president of 
the Council of Ministers. He returned to 
his bank. De Gaulle raised the bid, 
placing Pompidou at his side, at the 
head of the government, though he was 
neither an elected member, a deputy, nor 
a minister. Possessing the General’s 
confidence, he may one day be president 
of the republic.3
Historical Summary
Georges Pompidou was thirty-three years old, a 
professor of literature working on a critical study of 
Racine's Britannicus, when he joined de Gaulle's provisional 
government in 19^^. The General appointed the young profes­
sor to his cabinet as head of school and university affairs, 
a position demanding someone who could write well. When de 
Gaulle left the government on January 20, 19^6, Pompidou
found himself unemployed.
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The two men went their separate ways for two years. 
De Gaulle retired to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, and Pompidou 
joined the council of State. When de Gaulle's supporters 
formed the RPF in the spring of 19^7* they asked Pompidou 
to join them. He served as finance chairman of the RPF 
until the party officially disbanded on March 5> 1952.
De Gaulle began writing his War Memoirs in 1952 and 
completed the first volume in the spring of 195^• He en­
listed Pompidou's services as literary agent; the negotiations 
resulted in a satisfactory and lucrative contract. Later iri 
195^ Pompidou joined Baron Guy de Rothschild's bank. For 
the next five years he mingled with France's social and 
financial elite, gaining the respect and confidence of an 
important sector of the economy, and securing an appointment 
as director of the Rothschild bank.
The armed insurrection in Algiers on May 13» 1958, 
heralded the return of Charles de Gaulle to the political 
scene. Again de Gaulle asked Pompidou to join his cabinet.
On June 1, 1958, the National Assembly voted de Gaulle back 
into power as president of the Council of Ministers and the 
General appointed Pompidou director of his cabinet. De 
Gaulle became president of the republic on December 21, 1958 
after winning a majority of the electoral college.
Pompidou presided over the formation of the UNR 
that year as the Gaullists gained 212 seats in the National 
Assembly. De Gaulle remarked later that "history will never 
know the tremendous role played by Pompidou in the creation
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4of the Fifth Republic." The General rewarded Pompidou 
for his loyalty by appointing Michel Debre as prime mini­
ster. On January 8, 1959, the first day of the newly-’ 
inaugurated Fifth Republic, Pompidou resigned from the 
government to reclaim his position at Rothschild.
Georges Pompidou returned to public service on 
April 14, 1962, replacing Michel Debre as premier of France. 
His star was on the rise. At the age of fifty-one, he 
boasted impressive credentials in four different pursuits: 
as an intellectual (university professor, 1936-1944); as an 
administrator (de Gaulle*s chief of staff, 1948-52, 1958); as 
a financier (director of the Rothschild bank, 1954-62); and 
as a politician (premier of France, 1962-68). Pompidou was 
a man of many talents, a success by any definition.
His fortunes began to wan with de Gaulle's in 
March 1963, when inflation and a series of labor strikes 
racked France's economy. His reputation suffered greatly 
from his inability to offer immediate remedies to the social 
and economic ills that plagued the country. As was to happen 
in May 1968, the premier received the brunt of the criticism 
leveled at the government.
After de Gaulle's weak performance at the polls on 
the first ballot of the 1965 presidential elections, Pompidou 
pressed the General for the resignation of his minister of 
finance, Valery Giscard d ’Estaing. One author has summarized 
Pompidou's argument as follows.
By prolonging the austerity plan unduly, 
the minister of finance was largely respon­
sible for the failure of December fifth.
If we keep him on at the Rue de Rivoli 
(ministry of finance), we shall run the 
risk, for the same reasons, of suffering 
an even more serious setback in the 19&7 
(legislative) elections. -5
De Gaulle liked Giscard. He countered that the 
young man was highly talented and that he seemed to have 
France's best interests at heart, a rare compliment coming 
from de Gaulle. Pompidou prevailed, however, and finally 
convinced the General that he must dismiss Giscard. The 
embittered minister of finance later charged that Pompidou's 
unbridled presidential aspirations had resulted in Giscard's 
dismissal, an accusation not to be discounted. It is possible 
that Pompidou felt threatened by what he perceived to be Gis­
card 's rapidly expanding powers. The two men became bitter 
political enemies as a result of the 19&5 incident. Michel 
Debre, whome de Gaulle had dismissed from the Matignon in 
1962, was resurrected from political oblivion in 1965 to 
replacing Giscard as minister of finance.
Though silent at first, Giscard went into open 
opposition after de Gaulle's "Long live free Quebec!" speech 
in Montreal in 19&7- His "Yes, but ... " attitude enraged 
the General, as did the Independent Republicans' criticism 
of de Gaulle's methods. When asked to evaluate the General's 
performance in Montreal, Pompidou remarked, "As for me, I 
wouldn't know how to dramatize things. That's not my style." 
The young Turks of French politics were beginning to distance 
themselves from de Gaulle's style, Giscard in dramatic fashion, 
Pompidou more subtly.
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In June 1968 de Gaulle decided to replace Pompidou
for his indecisiveness during the student demonstrations of
the previous month. He appointed Couve de Murville premier.
After his dismissal Pompidou effected a reconciliation with
Giscard, who remarked wryly, "I know how it feels to he dis- 
7
missed."'
During his presidential campaign in May and June
g
1969, Pompidou adopted the slogan "Continuity and Opening."
This motto characterized the Pompidou style well: he could
continue in the General's footsteps with certain well-chosen 
deviations from the path. At the outset he stressed contin­
uity in his leadership. "It is enough for me to know that I
am profoundly Gaullist," he told the press. "That is what
9guides me and determines my actions."
The Gaullists were by no means united behind Pompidou, 
mainly because a longstanding rivalry existed between him and 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, leader of the Gaullist majority.
Before the 1969 election Pompidou agreed to ask Chaban-Delmas 
to be his prime minister in exchange for Gaullist support for 
his c a n d i d a c y . O n  June 1, .1969, Pompidou received the 
highest percentage of the first ballot with 43-95 percent.
Two weeks later he defeated challenger Alain Poher in the run­
off election with 57*58 percent of the vote."^ As promised,
he selected Chaban-Delmas as premier.
Pompidou enjoyed a comfortable majority (383 of 490 
seats) in the National Assembly when he took office. The
Gaullists had won 46.39 percent of the vote in the 1968 legi-
12 . .slative elections. Pompidou's parliamentary majority
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included two hundred ninety Gaullist deputies, sixty Inde­
pendent Republicans-(the party of Giscard d'Estaing), and 
thirty-three centrists of the Progress and Modern Democracy
parties. His opposition consisted primarily of Communists,
13Socialists, and splinter parties of the center-left. ^
Pompidou rated consistently favorable responses
in public opinion polls, averaging between 53 an<l percent
Ik
approval of his performance in office. One analyst attri­
butes this record to his strong public image. "One of the 
reasons for Pompidou's popularity ... was that he qualified 
as an intellectual. He was a graduate of a grande ecole,
Normale Sup^rieure, he had written an essay on Racine, and
13he was the editor of an anthology of French poetry." ^ One
Indication of the French public's esteem for Pompidou was
the naming of the Center for Arts, one of France's largest
and most popular museums, for him.
Once in office Pompidou outlined a three-pronged
program of "Completion, Development, and Enlargement." The
16Pompidou "triptych," as it became known, had three priori­
ties: (l) Completion of a common agricultural policy would
eliminate Internal tariffs among the Six and would promote 
the implementation of a common external tariff; (2) develop­
ment in depth was to include banking and monetary policy, 
taxation, social security legislation, and a common vote in 
foreign affairs (shades of the Fouchet Plan); and (3) enlarge­
ment of the Common Market meant admitting new members, most
17notably Great Britain. 1
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Pompidou's emphasis on expansion of ties with 
Western Europe, particularly within the framework of the 
EEC, stood in marked contrast to the policy of his predeces­
sor. "Europe was the crucible of the Pompidou government's 
foreign policy. Western Europe was to be the principal 
vehicle for the realization of France's domestic and foreign 
policy goals. Pompidou abandoned the traditional Gaullist 
shibboleths of independence and grandeur in favor of 'comple­
tion, enlargement, and strengthening* of ties with Western 
Europe.
Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway were admitted
19to the EEC in January 1972. Norway chose not to join. 7 On 
April 23> 1972, Pompidou submitted the issue of Britain's 
entry into the Common Market to popular referendum. Only 53 
percent of registered voters turned out, partly because the 
Socialist opposition had advised its members to abstain. The 
Communists had urged a "no" vote on the grounds that the EEC 
endangered French national interests. Of those who voted,
68 percent were in favor. Of all registered voters, 37 per­
cent were in favor, 17 percent were opposed, and k6 percent
20had abstained.
The Pompidou government considered the vote a suc­
cess, if not an overwhelming mandate. It is interesting to 
note that Pompidou used the referendum in much the same man­
ner as de Gaulle. The plebiscite did not really decide the 
issue, because the members of the Common Market had decided 
early in April to admit Britain. Pompidou staged the referen­
dum as a display of public confidence in his government.
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Pompidou was host to the Paris Conference of the 
Nine of October 19-20, 1972. The newly enlarged Common Mar­
ket now boasted 40 percent of the world's trade, 50 percent 
of the world's merchant marine, a population of 250 million, 
and one of the world's highest standards of living. Two 
members, Britain and France, possessed nuclear weapons. 
Pompidou tried to promote the idea of political integration, 
proposing that each nation send a minister of European affairs 
to Brussels. The conference adjourned without reaching an 
agreement.^
Pompidou's overture toward Britain constituted a
complete reversal of de Gaulle's policy. This is especially
puzzling considering the fact that continuity was one of the
campaign standards of the Pompidou government. Professor
Roy C. Macridis does not consider the admission of Britain
to the EEC a break with the past, however. He maintains that
de Gaulle was contemplating Such a move toward the end of his
22term m  office.
Whereas de Gaulle had always preferred politics on
a world scale, Pompidou proved himself willing to engage in
European summitry. He was instrumental in organizing the
conference of December 19&9 ("the Hague) , October 1972 (Paris) ,
21and December 1973 (Copenhagen). J He was particularly active
in the Copenhagen meeting of December 14-15> 1973 > which was
held to discuss the oil shortages Europe was experiencing in
24the wake of the Mideast war.
France's three main oil suppliers "between 1965
and 1972 were Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, all militant Arab
states. France suffered a substantial trade deficit with
2 *5all three during that six-year period. In 1971 > Pompidou
ended France's special relationship with Algeria, giving
independent oil companies free rein to deal with whomever
they chose. Saudi Arabia quickly replaced Algeria as
France's foremost supplier, while Algeria fell to number
seven. No state now supplies more than 16 percent of France
oil needs, compared to the 31 percent Algeria provided in
1968. French supplies now come from many different sources,
2 8but no nation monopolizes the trade. In spite of these
precautions, the Arab oil embargo of 197^ + hurt France. The
27inflation rate reached 1^ percent in 1973 and 197 •^
Pompidou's definition of Europe differed greatly 
from de Gaulle's. The General's Europe stretched from the 
Atlantic to the Urals and included Russia while excluding 
Britain. Pompidou's Europe, by contrast, extended from the 
Thames to the Elbe and included Britain while excluding 
Russia. Pompidou'is Europe was Western, Christian, capital-
2 o
ist and democratic. Addressing his European allies at the
Pompidou Conference in Paris on March 16, 1972, the French
president cited a common "geography, lifestyle, a certain
conception of democracy, and an evident political and econo- 
29mic interest" 7 that bound them. Pompidou's style at these 
summit meetings also contrasted with de Gaulle's. One obser 
ver of the French scene has noted that "Pompidou was more
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disposed than this predecessor to treat France's partners as
equals than as subordinates, creating thereby a more favora-
30ble climate for unity talks.
Another detour from the Gaullist style was Pompi­
dou's cooperation with the United States. Where de Gaulle 
had been combative, Pompidou was less so. He saw no inherent 
value in the politics of "no."
President Pompidou, abhorring open conflict 
to a fault and sensitive to French weakness, 
preferred accommodating United States power 
where possible and adjusting to it when nec­
essary. Better to work with United States 
influence than against it, even at the cost 
of a questionable international prestige in 
earning its ire. This was a commodity of 
doubtful economic and political marketability 
at home when the dominant objectives of the 
after 1968 were addressed to the prosperity 
and welfare of Frenchmen, not the grandeur 
and independence of the French nation.^!
As president, Pompidou concerned himself with what
de Gaulle contemptuously called "housekeeping". This shift
in priorities was apparent in Pompidou's television address
after the referendum of April 1972. "'What is Europe?'
say people with a short-run view. 'Take care of France,'
and of course, the government's task is to think first about
France and about Frenchmen, about their prosperity, about
their welfare, about the grandeur and independence of our 
32country."-^ In summary, Pompidou was as concerned with the 
welfare of Frenchmen as he was with the grandeur of France. 
There was a genuine outpouring of public grief when Pompidou 
died on April 2, 197^
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The Pompidou Style
In a 1965 biography of Georges Pompidou, the premier
is quoted as having described himself in these modest terms:
"In all my life, I have only made three or four decisions
concerning myself-—that of my marriage, that of leaving the
university to work with General de Gaulle, that of leaving
administration and politics to enter private business ... the
3Arest were imposed upon me."^ There is an element of truth
in this self-appraisal, especially as it describes Pompidou's
relationship with de Gaulle. As premier, he carried out de
Gaulle's policy decisions to the best of his ability. He
shone as an administrator. He performed equally well as
president without the General's guidance and far from his
imposing presence.
Lacking de Gaulle's personal prestige, 
authority, and historical credentials, 
and endowed with a more reserved person­
ality, President Pompidou viewed himself 
as ruling more by persuasion and manipu­
lation than by command. He did not claim 
any special priviledge or right to rule 
other than those conferred by the French 
electorate. "As for legitimacy, I hold 
my legitimacy from the free election of 
the French people who have carried me 
where I am and before whom I alone am 
re sponsible."53
While de Gaulle concerned himself with France, 
Pompidou occupied himself with the average Frenchman. Pompi­
dou was much more receptive to the point of view of others 
than was the General. He was accessible, open to persuasion, 
a good negotiator. De Gaulle had his head in the clouds; 
Pompidou had his feet planted firmly on the ground. The
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following statement from a Pompidou press conference illus­
trates this point.
"I'm not a historic personage. I represent 
no personal equation. I have my own style, 
my own manner, my own methods--and there's 
the difference. But in all essential mat­
ters I will not deviate an inch; all that 
counts is the independence of France, her 
role in Europe, and her position in the 
world. Little by little, day by day, I 
will see to it that she gets her proper 
share of things, without fanfare or drama.
But I will see to it."36
Pompidou's goal in the conduct of foreign policy 
was continuity and substance and change in style. According 
to his biographer Philippe Alexandre, Pompidou defended the 
General's attitudes and priorities and instinctively followed 
his predecessor in matters of state. Pompidou's style cannot 
be totally divorced from the General's, though. His pragmatic 
approach to politics is strongly reminiscent of de Gaulle's, 
as evidenced by the following pronouncement. "Politics dis­
gusts me. I have acquired a taste for it, because that is
37how one gets things done!
The de Gaulle-Pompidou relationship was one of 
mutual convenience. De Gaulle benefited as much from the 
services of his efficient lieutenant as Pompidou did from 
the General's patronage. Pompidou's biographer describes 
their relationship in the following terms. "De Gaulle made 
Pompidou master of requests, established him at the Matignon, 
made him appear on television, and will put him in the Elys^e 
tomorrow, if it pleases him."^^ This account gives Pompidou 
little credit for .his many talents. A more balanced, sober,
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and realistic description of their division of labor appears 
later intthe work. "The General reserved four domains to 
himself: Algeria, which remained fiery, explosive; the
constitution, foreign affairs, national defense. As for 
the rest, he placed his confidence in the man who was in his 
shadow, under his c o n t r o l . P h i l i p p e  Alexandre concurs in 
this appraisal, adding the "Pompidou had no connection with 
foreign affairs save insofar as they affected the nation's 
economy."
Since most of Pompidou's publications were scholarly 
critiques of literature, it is difficult to discern his poli­
tical world view in his writings. Unlike de Gaulle, he did 
not chronicle his role in world events. It is therefore nec­
essary to analyze his speeches, press conferences, and public 
statements to understand the man. Though he sometimes served 
as a mouthpiece for de Gaulle, his speeches offer an insight 
to his own political philosophy.
Pompidou delivered an excellent summary of his 
world view in an address before the American Glub in Paris 
on February 2^, 1964. He depicted a n e w  international world 
order, whose salient characteristics were the disappearance 
of a bipolar world, the emergence of a third world, and the
development of fissures within the Communist bloc. He noted
that France's role in this new order was a changing one.
The important thing is that there were two 
masses and that there was in each a head, 
an uncontested and solitary head. Since 
that time the world has moved on, and we
gradually saw the emergence of a third
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mass ... a third world, neutral or neutra­
list, it is said, whose principal concern 
is its own development, the effort to 
embark on industrial civilization and 
industrial prosperity. For this, it 
counts indiscriminately on the aid of 
one or the other bloc, at least of the 
one that wants to give this aid, and 
it fundamentally claims the right not to 
take sides. This is the first change.
A second change came about when, within 
one of these groups, (I am referring to 
the Communist group) divergencies, shades 
of opinion began to appear ... We find 
ourselves in the presence of a Communist 
bloc which is at the very least cut in 
two; not, of course, that we should over­
estimate these divergencies and maintain 
that these countries will clash directly 
and violently, but henceforth they march 
separately and their policy is independent.
And then, something has also happened 
within the Western bloc which is very 
different but nevertheless worthy of 
note: the countries of Europe ... have
little by little regained their strength.
And so the old division into somewhat 
monolithic groups is outmoded.
This extemporaneous commentary demonstrates Pompidou's appre­
ciation of the importance of the emerging non-aligned Third 
World, long before this term began to figure prominently in 
the vocabulary of western political analysts.
As might be expected, the philosophy of de Gaulle 
directly influenced Pompidou's interpretation of his country’s 
role in this changing world order. The General considered the 
worldwide revolt against the bipolar system, which he called 
the "two hegemonies," to be the major phenomenon of our time. 
Pompidou stressed the independent role of France which, like
the Third World, should pursue a policy of non-alignment.
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France, member of the European Community 
and of the Atlantic Alliance, for this 
reason does not intend to perpetuate the 
policy of blocs ... We hope that relations 
between East and West might one day be nor­
malized and founded, in spite of the dif­
ferences between regimes, on respect for 
the rights of all and for the independence 
of everyone. Situated as she is geogra­
phically and supported by her historical 
traditions, France will be able to assume 
her own role in the necessary re-establish­
ment of good relations at least on the day 
when the totalitarian world sincerely 
renounces any inclination to commit
aggression.^3
Ever the pragmatist, Pompidou considered the pos­
sibility of such a day only rhetorically. He was well aware 
of the role that the American nuclear umbrella played in the 
defense of Western Europe. He placed more credence in the 
deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal than did de 
Gaulle. In his defense of the General's 1966 decision to 
withdraw from NATO, Pompidou argued that the organization 
itself could not prevent war and that only the American 
nuclear threat could deter the Soviet aggression.
If there were to be a third great war in 
Europe, it would be nuclear and Europe 
would be destroyed ... but the nuclear wea­
pon is not made to win war? it is made to 
prevent it. The aggressor's certainty 
that he would sustain unacceptable losses 
is the only guarantee that we can have 
against aggression ... That is what leads 
us to remain in the Atlantic Alliance.
You think in terms of war, and of yester­
day's war. We think in terms of deterrence, 
that is to say, of peace. Deterrence alone 
can guarantee peace, and for the West the 
only deterrence is nuclear. You tell us:
NATO has guaranteed peace in Europe for 
fifteen years. What an error, if you 
are referring to the integrated organiza­
tion! What has guaranteed peace is the 
alliance, insofar as it has brought to
6l
to bear the threat of the. American Strategic 
Air Command ... It is atomic power, particu­
larly American, also British and French, 
that is preserving it. You believe solely 
in integration, and that an alliance without 
integration is of no use, while only the 
nuclear weapons that are not integrated 
really count. You believe that the war can 
be won, while we can only hope to avert it 
by atomic deterrence.^
Disregarding the conventional military value of the NATO 
alliance and emphasizing the value of the American nuclear 
umbrella, Pompidou demonstrated a sound theoretical grasp 
of the concept of deterrence.
In his statements Georges Pompidou proved himself 
a well-informed, articulate, and persuasive speaker. He 
exhibited a knowledge of current events and'theoretical 
concepts that often eluded his colleagues. His sharp mind 
absorbed ideas, assimilated them, and organized them into 
rational, coherent, convincing arguments. Pompidou worked 
at a faster pace than most men, easily sustaining a workload 
that quickly drained others. His intellect and capacity for 
work made him a habitual achiever and a formidable opponent.
Georges Pompidou was one of the rare individuals 
who succeeded at almost everything he tried. It was relative­
ly easy to trace the experiences that combined to equip him so 
well for office. His early academic training contributed 
greatly to his success. Thoroughly schooled In the rigors 
of Cartesian logic and literary criticism, he applied this 
training in his defense of Gaullist policies before the 
National Assembly. His mastery of detail and of general 
theory was impressive.
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His experience as an administrator, both under de 
Gaulle and with the Council of State led him to understand 
the machinations of the French political system. The image 
of the cool, methodical, plodding Pompidou emerged during 
the period 19^+ to 1952. He cultivated a variety of valuable 
contacts and polished his interpersonal skills.
Pompidou's experience in the world of business 
proved equally- valuable. He distinguished himself in the 
financial world as a director of one of France's most presti­
gious banks. The reputation he established in the private 
sector brought benefits in the form of contributions to de 
Gaulle's political campaigns during the early days of the 
Fifth Republic.
As a politician he drew upon all his previous train­
ing. His political future, nurtured and sanctioned by de 
Gaulle, seemed assured. Yet Pompidou's relationship with 
de Gaulle proved both his greatest asset and greatest liability. 
Of all conditions affecting his career, his association with 
de Gaulle had the greatest impact. Though a Gaullist in sub­
stance, he was not a Gaullist in style. The General prefer­
red "man of the hour" situations: June 18, 19^0, and May 13>
1958, are classic examples. He also loved dramatic exits: 
witness January 20, 19^ +6, and April 27» 1969* Pompidou pre­
ferred continuity in his career to periods of self-imposed 
exile. While de Gaulle waited in the wings, Pompidou applied 
himself to new challenges. By his own admission, he was not 
a historic personage. De Gaulle preferred drama and high
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visibility; Pompidou preferred calm and a low profile. De 
Gaulle negotiated publicly, often in the press; Pompidou 
excelled at behind-the-scenes bargaining. In matters of 
style, the two men were the antithesis of one another. In 
the Hegelian tradition, the thesis and antithesis of de Gaulle 
and Pompidou often merged to form a rational synthesis.
Whereas de Gaulle openly sought his niche in 
history, Pompidou was not always master of his own fate.
He did not actively seek public office until he became pre­
mier at the age of 51* Both men emerged as national figures: 
de Gaulle be design, Pompidou more by circumstance.
There were two main differences between the foreign 
policies of de Gaulle and Pompidou. Pompidou subordinated 
foreign policy to domestic concerns, while emphasizing the 
importance of the Atlantic alliance and his Western European 
allies. ^ There were also several substantive changes under 
Pompidou, which included (1) moderated criticism of the 
United States, (2) enlarged ties with Europe and Britain,
(3) emphasis of regionalism rather than globalism, (4) more 
multilateral diplomacy, using the talent and resources of the 
Quai d'Orsay, (5) limited use of the empty chair as a bargain­
ing tool, (6) renewal of coalition politics in domestic and
foreign policy, and (7) the notion that actions speak louder 
A 6than words.
The three objectives of Pompidou's foreign policy 
derived almost entirely from de Gaulle's: independence of the
two hegemonies, enhancement of international prestige, and 
the extension and enlargement of French power. The Pompidou
6A
style affected two areas primarily.. A warning of relations 
with London resulted in Britain's admission to the Common 
Market in 1972 and renewed ties with Washington led to a 
stronger French participation in NATO. Pompidou's acknowledg­
ment that the American nuclear umbrella was the cement of the 
NATO alliance differed from de Gaulle's stance. It showed a 
pragmatism and solidarity with allies that was uncharacteristic 
of his predecessor.
Conclusions
(1) Pompidou's experience in four areas (academic, 
administrative, financial, and political) molded his world 
view. An intellectual at heart, he combined his talents with 
great success. He did not possess de Gaulle's flair for the 
dramatic, nor did he consider himself a historic personage.
His political style was more methodical and discrete than 
flamboyant.
(2) Pompidou's relationship with de Gaulle influen­
ced his presidential style, which was often the antithesis of' 
the General's.
(3) Support for Pompidou varied during his twenve 
years in office. His special relationship with de Gaulle 
ended in the summer of 1968. His relations with parliament 
changed from a vote of no-confidence in 1962 to a predominantly 
Gaullist legislature after his election in 1969*
(A) Pompidou continued the General's pursuit of 
independence, prestige, and power in foreign policy.
(5) Pompidou strengthened relations with the western 
allies, especially the United States and Great Britain. His
flexibility vis 'k vis such issues as France's role in NATO 
and Britain's admission to the EEC improved France's image 
in Washington and London. Because of his low profile, 




It has been said that de Gaulle was a man of des­
tiny, obsessed with the independence and grandeur of France. 
Pompidou was pragmatic, a manipulator and negotiator. It is 
difficult to characterize Valery Giscard d'Estaing in such 
terms, for he brings a different set of qualifications to 
office than either of his predecessors.
One commentator has described Giscard as France's 
philosopher-president, and with good reason.'*' In 1977 Giscard 
published French Democracy, an interesting treatise on French 
modernization and its effect on his country and countrymen. 
Giscard argues his points in a crisp, clear style that vividly 
illustrates his intellectual capacities. In his book*fche 
French president proposes a four-point plan that includes a 
higher minimum wage, a more progressive system of taxation,
decentralization of government, and a loosening of price 
2
controls. These programs are designed to help alleviate 
some of the inequities of modern French society.
Ar article that appeared in the weekly newsmagazine 
1'Express during the presidential campaign of 197^ was entitled 
"Giscard Technocrat" and called him "the young man for whom
3
everything has gone so well."^ A graduate of France's
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prestigious National School of Administration, Giscard rose 
rapidly through the ranks of the inspectorate of finance. 
Appointed minister of finance in 1962, Giscard was consid­
ered one of France's most promising young technocrats. One 
analyst has described France's young crop of technical ex­
perts as follows.
A great number of ministerial posts were 
given to technicians. These men never held 
an electoral office but came from the admin­
istrative services that recruited from the 
elite schools of France--notably the Ecole 
Natlonale d 'Administration, established in 
19^6 ... They were above all technicians 
and managers, concerned with doing things, 
providing for services, establishing plans 
for economic development, running the public 
social and economic services. They were the 
"technocrats"--with an eye to efficiency and 
pragmatic choices, to statistics and econo­
mic charts. They were servants of the state 
rather than elected representatives of the 
people.^
A poll conducted in April 197^ + 1 one month before 
Giscard was elected to office, confirmed this public image. 
Respondents were asked to rank perceived strengths and weak­
nesses in the candidate's character. The public considered 
Giscard's technical competence as his greatest asset, fol­
lowed by his ability to handle responsibility, his unquestioned 
integrity, his communications skills, and last of all, his 
Catholicism. The public perception of Giscard*s weaknesses 
is perhaps more revealing. He was thought by many to be 
better acquainted with facts and figures than with human reali­
ties; some considered him a grand bourgeois; finally, he was 
perceived as a solitary man.-*
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A comparison of the relative strengths and weak­
nesses of Giscard and his challenger Francois Mitterrand 
gave Giscard a definite advantage. Frenchmen were asked 
which of the following traits applied to each candidate.
(See table on page 69)
It is difficult to categorize Giscard the philosopher- 
intelleetual-technocrat. Philippe Alexandre offers the fol­
lowing irreverent and entertaining description of France's 
current present.
France, too, has her- eggheads. Giscard d'Estaing, 
a disciple of Kennedy and Galbraith, is one of 
them. Reared in the expectation that he would 
one day become president of the republic, in 
1962 at the age of 36, he was appointed minister 
of finance. He appeared to be on'his way. But 
less than four years later he was dismissed 
from the past by Pompidou. D'Estaing struck 
back by criticizing the General, uttering his 
famous "Yes, but ..." After de Gaulle departed 
in 1969 he entertained the hope of becoming 
president, but his aspirations proved short­
lived. Realizing he was still too young, he 
finally decided to support Pompidou. The new 
president rewarded Giscard by reinstalling 
him as minister of finance. Slender, elegant, 
and prematurely bald like so many brilliant in­
tellectuals, he likes to ski and hunt wild game 
in Africa. His wife and daughts are all named 
after flowers.?
Giscard's World View
Few political leaders commit their philosophies to 
print while they are still in office. De Gaulle specialized 
in ex post facto analysis, preferring to chronicle his role 
in world events in the form of memoirs. Pompidou's publica­
tions consisted mainly of scholarly literary analyses. By 
contrast, Giscard published French Democracy after only three
years in office. He sets forth his world view in this short
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but often eloquent work. In the opening pages he summarizes 
the effects of modernization of France, noting that France 
has changed more since 195° than it did in the 80 years 
before mid-century. He cites the following statistics 
for the period 1950-1975* France's national product more 
than tripled in volume, and real consumption per capita 
nearly tripled; the infant mortality rate was reduced by 25 
percent; a man's life expectancy increased by six years and 
a women's by eight; the amount spent on food declined by 
half, that spent on hygiene and health increased threefold; 
six times as many young people obtained their baccalaur­
eates; the minimum old age pension increased threefold in 
real terms; and eight and a half million houses of apartments 
were built. He notes that in 1950, no one had a washing 
machine or television set; by 1975 seven out of ten had a
o
television. He fails to mention that in 1950, few people
in the world owned a television set. Finally, he points out
that in order to earn what they need to buy the same goods,
Frenchmen have to work only half as long as they did twenty 
9years ago. The economist's penchant for figures and statis­
tical trends is apparent in this description. Giscard*s nar­
ration gives evidence of his technical background, of his 
insistence on precision and accuracy. In a later digression 
Giscard informs his readers that "the social sciences in France 
are insufficiently developed, and opinion about the facts is 
constantly preferred to knowledge of the facts themselves."^
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In his discussion of French modernization Giscard
compares the strength of the French economy to that of its
neighbors, Great Britain and West Germany. He takes great
pride in his nation's performance, maintaining that France
is the world's third largest exporter, on a par with Japan,
and that it has a gross national product 56 percent higher
than Britain's.^ Projecting these figures into the future,
Giscard predicts that by 1985» France's industrial production
12should be comparable to West Germany's.
Though Giscard is no Gaullist, he echoes many of 
the General's favorite themes in foreign policy, including 
competition with Britain, an utter contempt for Marxist 
ideology, and the reaffirmation of France's independence.
It is noteworthy that Giscard''s competition with Britain is 
economic, whereas de Gaulle's was political. Giscard’s 
attack oh Marxism is in much the same vein as his criticism 
of the social sciences in France; the technocrat in him rebels 
at the inconsistencies inherent in Marxist doctrine. "Marxism 
mystifies when it claims scientific status while ignoring the 
disciplines of science; when it attributes all oppression to 
economic power; when it reduces the history of nations to the
class war; when It confers upon one particular class a messianic
IB - • •and redemptive role." Finally, Giscard is as uncompromising
as de Gaulle about French independence, which he defines as
"the right to decide for ourselves, in the last resort, every-
thing we consider essential for the French nation."
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Independence is not the essential ingredient of 
Giscard's foreign policy. He also stresses cooperation, 
a term quite foreign to de Gaulle's vocabulary. "Foreign 
policy,1 he writes, "will be based on the will to remain
1<
independent and the practice of solidarity and cooperation."
Here Giscard signals a departure from Gaullist doctrine in
style as well as substance. "To assert its independence,"
he continues, "France does not need to be cantankerous. And
when it practices cooperation France does not risk being
16diminished, for it has a vocation to cooperate."
Giscard specifies three goals that France will pur­
sue in its relations with European allies. His policy of 
cooperation and solidarity translates into the following 
concrete actions: the healing of relations with Germany,
begun by de Gaulle and Adenauer; solidification of ties with-
17in the EEC; and the formation of a European Parliament. ' As
a former minister of finance, Giscard feels strongly about
the economic unification of Europe.
French democracy has clear ideas about the 
union of Europe. We shall not try to impose 
a detailed plan on others, but we intend to 
prevent Europe from dissolving into confused 
or impotent structures. First of all, 
economic and monetary union must be completed, 
according to the terms of the Treaty of Roem.
It has to be admitted that this much-needed 
union is still a long way off. Our number 
one task is to make it a reality. Next we 
must make progress with the confederal machi­
nery of the European union,
In a final rather general summary Giscard outlines 
his view of France's international role. Like Pompidou be­
fore him he admits that the world is still dominated by
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competition between the superpowers and conflict among the 
nations belonging to the main alliances. He stresses that 
France will continue to pursue a policy of detente in its 
relations with the superpowers. He singles out the indep­
endent states of Africa as an area of special interest to 
France, indicating that Fr^ce will continue to give them 
financial support as well as other types of aid. In a 
departure from Gaullist doctrine, he notes that France will 
cooperate ratherthan confront in relations with its allies. 
In conclusion he acknowledges the interdependence of the 
nations of the world, stating that the solution to economic 
problems and security issues cannot be found at a national 
or regional level, but only at a world level.^
Historical Summary
Val'ery Giscard d'Estaing was born in 1926 of a
distinguished family of civil servants who for centuries
20have combined careers m  finance with public service.
He enlisted in the French army in 1 9 ^  and saw his first 
action at the age of eighteen against SS units in the 
Danube region. After the war he enrolled in the National 
School of Administration and graduated at the top of his 
class. In 1952 he joined the inspectorate of finance and 
served in a variety of capacities during the next ten years.
After de Gaulle appointed Giscard minister of fin­
ance in 1962 the young man embarked upon a deflationary pro­
gram of austerity to cool down France's economy. Giscard's 
outspoken manner did little to endear him to the aging Gen­
eral, however. When de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his
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government in 1965» he formed his own party, the Independent 
Republicans- Shortly after Pompidou's victory in the presi­
dential campaign of 1969 he re-appointed Giscard minister of 
finance. When Pompidou died in April 1974, the forty-eight- 
year-old Giscard skirmished with established members of the 
Gaullist coalition for leadership of the right. His opponents 
included Edgar Faure and Pierre Messmer, both relies of the 
Gaullist old guard, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas. Giscard and 
Chaban-Delmas represented the right on the first ballot of 
the presidential election held May 5> 1974.
Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist leader and candi­
date of the left won 43*24 percent of the votes on the first
ballot. Giscard followed with 32.60 percent of votes cast,
21and Chaban-Delmas brought up the rear with 15*10 percent. 
During the critical two-week period before the run-off 
election Mitterrand and Giscard courted uncommitted members 
of the pivotal center-left parties, particularly the Unified 
Socialists and Radicals. Mitterrand was counting heavily 
on the dissolution of the center vote and its defection to 
the left.
Though Mitterrand gained support from the center,
he did not gain enough to win. Giscard suffered losses from
22the same quarter but not enough to lose. In the left's
best performance since de Gaulle came to power, Mitterrand
23received 11,882,926 votes or 49.20 percent of votes cast.
Giscard received 50*80 percent of votes on the second ballot,
defeating his challenger by a margin of less than A00,000 
2Uvotes.
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A composite analysis of the electorate showed that
Giscard's supporters were predominantly older, female, and
2 5
rural; Mitterrand's were younger, male, and urban. ^
Giscard*s support was also conservative and in many cases 
non-Gaullist, as a poll of his political constituency revealed. 
A survey conducted by Nouvelles Litteraires indicated that 
53 percent of Giscard's voters held a positive view of Marshal 
P^tain, leader of the collaborationist Vichy regime.^
Addressing the French public immediately after the 
election, Giscard announced, "I understood during this cam­
paign that you wanted change, social and political change.
You won't be disappointed. I will bring about change, with 
27your help." Once in office, Giscard sponsored legislation 
to lower the voting age to eighteen, to legalize abortion, 
and to liberalize France's strict divorce statutes. His gov­
ernment increased the minimum wage and retirement benefits, 
offered asylum to political exiles, suppressed wiretapping, 
and curtailed arms sales to undemocratic regimes.
In 1978 Giscard*s cabinet consisted of thirty-six 
posts, the largest ever in the Fifth Republic. Only fifteen 
were ministers-with-portfolio, however. The other twenty-one 
were secretary-of-state positions for such diverse areas as 
foreign labor, university affairs, penitentiaries, and adult 
education. There were three women in the cabinet, two of 
whom were ministers. Six cabinet members were graduates of 
the National School of Administration, three were from the 
Institute of Political Studies, and four were former civil
servants. Giscard has drawn heavily from among his fellow 
technocrats. Though some cabinet members were in their early 
forties, most were in their fifties like Giscard. A majority 
of Giscard's ministers were centrists; only one-third were 
Gaullists.^
In the finest tradition of de Gaulle, Giscard has 
made unilateral policy decisions without consulting his cabi­
net. In 197^ he anounced his intention to conduct underground 
nuclear tests. When Giscard ignored Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schrieber's criticism of his decision, the leader of France's
29Radical party resigned from the cabinet m  protest.  ^ Frangois 
Giroud, secretary-of-state for women's affairs, left the gov­
ernment in disgust after Giscard repeatedly discounted her 
recommendations. The former editor of 1 1 Express has written 
an account of her experiences entitled The Comedy of Government 
Giscard's party does not enjoy a majority in the 
National Assembly. In 1975 his governing coalition included
185 Gaullists and 110 centrists, mostly Independent Republi- 
30cans. The Communist-Socialist alliance of the left mounted
one of the greatest challenges to Giscard's rule during the
legislative elections of March 1978. The two parties agreed
on a platform known as the "Common Program" inl972 and public
opinion polls conducted before the 1978 elections favored the
31alliance to win. The legislative elections of 1978 were 
as hotly contested as the presidential contest four years 
earlier. There was a record 85 percent turnout for the run­
off election. The Union for French Democracy, organized by
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Giscard's supporters in the closing.days of the campaign, won 
137 seats and emerged as the second largest party (behind the 
Gaullists) in the National Assembly. The Gaullists lost sup-
32port, returning 1^8 of an original 170 deputies to parliament.
In all, the Gaullists and the Union for French Democracy cap­
tured 285 of parliament's ^90 seats, a clear majority.
The election was not the overwhelming victory for 
the left that the pollsters had predicted. Voters who sup­
ported the left on the first ballot defected to the right on 
the second. Raymond Aron, who describes the French intel­
ligentsia as "the most intelligent and the most unreasonable
in the world" notes that many vote their convictions on the
33first ballot and their pocketbooks on the second.  ^ Practi­
cal considerations outstrip ideological ones in the end. The 
election did prove that the united left is a political force 
to take into account. De Gaulle had always maintained that 
there were two poles in the French political spectrum: the
Gaullists and the Communists. Andre Malraux went so far as
3 A
to say that "between the Communists and us there is nothing."^ 
After the 1978 election Giscard's advisors admitted that one 
of de Gaulle's greatest errors had been to accentuate this 
polarization. The dominance of the extreme right and the 
extreme left in French politics has become a thing of the 
past. Giscard seems to prefer it that way. He has stated 
that his dream is to end the polarization of French politics. 
The 1978 election proved that there are four main parties in 
the French political spectrum rather than two. The Independent
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Republicans won almost as many seats in the National Assembly
as the Gaullists, and the Socialists commanded more vote than
3 <the Communists for the first time since World War II. ^
As a politician Giscard has shown considerable 
talent for deflecting the criticism his opponents direct to­
ward his government. He has insulated himself from direct 
scrutiny by letting his prime minister act as a political 
lightning rod. When his first premier, the Gaullist Jacques 
Chirac, resigned in August 1976 Giscard named Raymond Barre 
as his successor. Giscard introduced Barre to the French 
public as "France*s best economist," citing his credentials 
as a professor of economics at the Sorbonne. The president 
promised voters that Barre would remedy inflation and im­
prove the economic situation in time for the 1978 elections. 
This political move protected Giscard from the criticism of 
Chirac's Gaullists and the left, prompting political pundits 
to call Barre "Giscard's life-jacket" and "presidential 
battleship.
Barre is well acquainted with the politics of con­
frontation. Two decades ago he represented France before the 
Common Market Commission, where his criticisms of American 
monetary and trade policies won high mark from de Gaulle.
He also served as minister of foreign trade in Chirac's cabi­
net. Responding to an American warning against Communist 
participation in Western European governments in 1978, Barre
replied in typical Gaullist fashion, "France does not have to
37take advice or lessons from anyone.'-
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Barre has enjoyed a certain degree of success at 
his appointed task. His anti-inflationary measures reduced 
France's inflation rate "by three percentage points in time 
for the 1978 election. He has also helped cement relations 
"between Paris and Washington. ^  Giscard's tactic of letting 
Barre act as "lightning rod" for general discontent cost him 
some popularity in the polls. A survey conducted "by the con­
servative newspaper Le Figaro showed that the favorable rating 
of Giscard's performance in office slipped from 62 percent 
in January 1979 to 5A percent in July to a mere ^9 percent in 
September. Barre's likewise fell from 36 percent in July 1979 
to 29 percent in September. When compared to Jimmy Carter's 
rating of 19 percent approval in September 1979» Giscard's low 
of 49 percent does not seem so abysmal. Also, compared to the 
fortunes of the Gaullists, who were seriously contemplating a 
change in leadership in September 1979» Giscard was riding 
high.
Giscard's timely appointment of Premier Raymond 
Barre helped salvage the domestic and international situatio 
for the president. Above all, his narrow margins- of victory 
in 197^ and 1978 indicate that he is a survivor.
Gis card's Foreign Policy
Giscard is a political realist, as evidenced by 
his criticism of President's Carter's human right policies, 
but he does not advocate a return to Cold War relations 
between East and West. His main objection to Carter's 
human rights stand was that it had compromised the process
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/ 39 ♦ • sof detente. In a July 1977 interview he descrihed detente
as the only reasonable alternative to an escalating arms race
between Moscow and Washington.
I don't believe that detente is a ruse 
to lull the West into a false sense of 
security while they achieve global mili­
tary supremacy and later world domination.
In my judgment, Moscow's detente objec­
tives are limited and specific. Firstly, 
a slowdown and then a reduction in the 
nuclear arms race on the basis of parity.
Mr. Brezhnev is wondering whether one 
of the U.S. objectives isn’t to recap­
ture a measure of military technological 
superiority. Secondly, the recognition 
that there are very real and specific 
areas for developing economic, political, 
and cultural cooperation outside the 
ideological competition.
Detente is an alternative to a senseless 
arms race. Detente is an option on the 
opposite course that is designed to avoid 
confrontation and maintain rough parity 
in armaments, while attempting to col­
laborate, without forsaking our respective 
convictions that one side's system is 
superior to the other.^0
Giscard aired these opinions shortly after Brezh­
nev's state visit to Paris in June 1977» which focused 
upon the issue of detente.^ The French government re­
considered its position after the Soviet invasion of Afghani­
stan in December 1979* Though the French initially took a 
milk view of the invasion, they later modified their stance. 
Eleven days after the news became public, Giscard signed a 
joint statement with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt con­
demning the Soviet move, then proceeded to soften his state­
ment in the course of background briefings for domestic con­
sumption. He seemed reluctant to condemn the Soviet action
A2or to endorse it.
Giscard refused to support an American initiative 
to impose sanctions against the Soviets during the spring of 
1980. When France opposed a meeting of European leaders in 
Bonn, the United States scuttled the plan. Instead, Secre­
tary of State Cyrus Vance made a fast-paced visit to several 
European capitals. Cherishing its special relationship with 
Moscow, France had once again distanced itself from an Ameri- 
can position. J French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poneet
remarked early in the crisis that "France is not America's 
AAbarnyard." Giscard issued an angry statement criticizing
American efforts to coordinate allied sanctions against the
Soviets that signalled to Moscow his reluctance to line up
behind Washington. In a later press conference, he commented
I'm surprised at the Insistence of certain 
people to push us--unsuccessfully, by the 
way--toward alignment with the ideas of 
this one or that one, that is to say, the 
reconstitution of the system of blocs 
that increase tension on one hand and on 
the other eliminate the margin for maneu­
ver and influence of France's foreign 
policy ... Any meeting that would result 
in a bloc approach to the current situation 
will not win French participation.
An American mission dispatched to enlist the sup­
port of European leaders was rebuffed in Paris, primarily 
because it had arrived uninvited. The Americans had the 
effrontery to visit Paris with their initiative in hand, 
rather than submitting it in advance through channels for 
French endorsement. Because France had not been consulted 
beforehand (shades of de Gaulle), it would not be party to 
any sanctions agreement. Giscard sought to balance France 
between East and West by refusing to take sides in the disput
Asked what de Gaulle would have done in such a 
crisis, Maurice Couve de Murville, the General's foreign 
minister of many years replied, "A country that is a member 
of an alliance cannot say that it is non-aligned. It is a 
contradiction in terms. France should follow its own policy. 
It should not offer its good offices between the superpowers." 
Giscard admitted that his policy was too complicated for the 
American public to understand. A member of his staff remar­
ked to a reporter, "To the average American, it undoubtedly
looks contradictory to say that we are your allies and we
A7have our own independent foreign policy." '
Like any successful politician, Giscard is an oppor­
tunist. His willingness to exploit a temporary advantage has 
resulted in strengthening of ties with the Common Market,
NATO, and France's former colonial possessions in Africa. 
Giscard's vision of an expanded Common Market with more Medi­
terranean members has not always been popular with his country 
men. He has expressed a commitment to membership for Greece 
and Spain, partly to support the democratic governments that 
have replaced military regimes there. His support for Portu­
guese membership is less vocal. Almost all the French parties 
led by the Gaullists, have opposed the Spanish and Greek appli
cations. They fear that these countries will flood the French
A8market with surplus wine and produce, undercutting prices.
This feeling is particularly strong in the Midi region, where 
French farmers annually converge on the provincial capital 
of Montpellier to protest the influx of inexpensive foreign 
wines into the local market.
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Giscard has shelved his plans for expanding the 
EEC in the face of domestic opposition. He remains committed 
to the principle of strengthening Europe through such organi­
zations as the European Parliament and the Common Market, 
however.
Despite all the doom and gloom, another 
important point has been the agreement 
on European elections for a European 
Assembly by universal suffrage. Over 
100 million Europeans will go to the 
polls on the same day in nine countries 
to cast their ballots in a gesture of 
continental dimension. Cassandras not­
withstanding, this decision was taken 
by France and Britain at the same time.
Those who say this does not strengthen 
the European Executive (of the Common 
Market) cannot see the forest for the 
trees. In a world of crisis and turmoil,
Europe is still moving forward. I get 
very irritated by these constant plaintive 
whimpers on the sad fate of Europe.^9
Recent events suggest that France may be consider­
ing rejoining the NATO a l l i a n c e . T h e  thirteen-member 
defense grouping would certainly benefit from such a move, 
which would increase NATO strength in Europe by half a mil­
lion troops, more than 1,000 tanks, and some $00 aircraft.
The European argument in favor of France's return 
to the fold is persuasive. Deployment of French ground for­
ces would relieve the 5°0>0°0-man West German army of its 
singular responsibility for the defense of the corridor sep­
arating Europe from the Warsaw Pact. The only countries with 
any sizable troop presence in the forward positions are 
Britain (55>000) and the United States (225>000). Since the 
United States abolished the military draft in 197^ +, reserves
8^are so depleted that it is unlikely the United States could 
muster any immediate ground support in case of a Soviet con­
ventional assault on West Germany.. Soviet military planners 
are currently uncertain how France would react if West Germany 
were attacked, hut a firm commitment from France would settle 
the issue and strengthen the alliance. In summary, French 
power is needed to fill the void created by waning American 
influence and general apathy among smaller members of the 
alliance. Such a commitment would also improve NATO's over­
all effectiveness and morale as a European combat unit.
The French argument against the move is equally 
compelling. What has France to gain from such an arrangement? 
If American influence in the region is indeed evaporating, 
this only serves to justify de Gaulle's decision of fifteen 
years ago. The General was correct in questioning the Ameri­
can commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Besides, 
how could France's independent nuclear strike force be inte­
grated into the NATO command structure? Furthermore, French 
troops would never agree to follow the command of Americans, 
who still dominate the upper echelons of the organization.
As the world's third most powerful nation militarily, France 
has everything to lose and nothing to gain by rejoining NATO, 
Finally, and most important, the French argue, it is not NATO 
but the American nuclear deterrent that prevents Soviet aggres­
sion. Premier Pompidou articulated this conviction on April 
21, 1966, when he defended de Gaulle's decision to withdraw 
from NATO before the National Assembly.
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You tell us: NATO has guaranteed peace
in Europe for fifteen years. What an
error, if you are referring to the inte­
grated organization! What has guaranteed 
peace is the alliance, insofar as it has 
brought to bear the threat of the American 
Strategic Air Command ... It is atomic 
power, primarily American, also British 
and French, that is preserving it.-51
Professor Roy C. Macridis has described France's
. . ■ . ^2military strategy as "how to have the alliance and the bomb."^
French military planners, according to his theory, envision 
the NATO alliance as a first line of defense against aggres­
sion from the East, while the nuclear strike force serves as
a weapon of last resort. In a typical scenario, NATO and 
French forces would defend Western Europe in conventional 
battle. If It became apparent that the aggressor intended to 
invade and occupy France, the French government would alert 
the enemy that it was willing to retaliate with nuclear wea­
pons. This critical threshold of aggressiveness is the key 
to the situation. Having issued a warning, the French govern­
ment would then consider itself free to employ the nuclear 
strike force independently on NATO, regardless of whether 
NATO ground forces were still engaged in battle.
Obviously, this scenario contradicts the spirit and 
intention of the NATO alliance. The nuclear strike force 
isolates France from its allies, since it cannot be integrated 
into the NATO command structure. According to Macridis, the 
basic problem is France's intransigence in the face of any 
form of integration--be it political or military.
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Though avoiding military integration with his
NATO allies, Giscard has agreed to define the circumstances
under which the nuclear strike force would be employed
against an aggressor. This is reassuring to the NATO allies,
v/ho were stunned in November 1968 when de Gaulle's chief of
staff, General Ailleret, announced France's all-horizons
defense plan,^ This plan anticipated enemies on all sides,
and stated France's intention to oppose the aggressor from
54whatever quarter he came. In short, France's nuclear strike 
force was poised to strike in all directions.  ^ Under Pompidou, 
the army was reorganized in a manner that emphasized the pri­
macy of the nuclear weapon--with improved delivery capabili­
ties and the development of some four nuclear submarines with 
m i s s i l e s . P o m p i d o u  decreased overall defense spending, 
however: in 1970, for the first time in the Fifth Republic,
expenditure for education and research exceeded that for
<7
national defense.^' Under Giscard, a spirit of cooperation 
and consultation with the NATO alliance appears to have 
replaced the Gaullist tradition of confrontation with allies. 
Giscard is resigned to the reality of Europe's dependence on 
the United States for its ultimate defense.
France's activites in Africa indicate an increased 
awareness of its role as a member of the western alliance.
In April 1977 Giscard convinced King Hassan II of Morocco 
to dispatch 1,500 troops to the aid of Zairian President 
Mobutu's embattled army in the mineral-rich Shaba province. 
France provided transports and technical advisers for the 
airlift. The Moroccans helped turn the tide against the
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Katangan invaders, who were reportedly supported by Cuban 
advisors from Angola. King Hassan II afterward maintained 
that
Charles de Gaulle never would have abandoned 
Africa's French-speaking countries. This 
policy (military support for former French 
colonies) was shelved under Pompidou but is 
now being revived under Giscard. High time, 
too. Nothing succeeds like s uccess.59
Hassan appears to have a selective memory. Pompidou in fact
re-opened official relations with Morocco on December 15»
1969, after de Gaulle had severed them. At that time Hassan
II said "I did not acede to de Gaulle. I have no reason to
60do so before Pompidou."
Giscard won the applause of both Zaire and the U.S. 
Department of State for his African venture. In May 1978 
the Katangan rebels launched a similar invasion, this time 
aimed at the copper-mining town of Kolwezi. Giscard respon­
ded by airlifting 600 paratroopers of France's crack Foreign 
Legion in conjunction with Belgian forces. The Legionnaires 
did most of the fighting in and around Kolwezi, precipitating 
a massive withdrawal by the invaders. Giscard evacuated the 
Legionnaires shortly after their successful mission. Again 
he won the approbation of the United States and the Western 
allies, with the exception of the Belgians, former colonial 
masters of the region. Concerning his decision to intervene 
in Zaire, Giscard commented: "I came to the conclusion that
the U.S. and Europe were absent in Africa at a very crucial 
moment and that it was necessary to act on our own to pre­
serve the security and territorial integrity of a western-
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oriented state— which, hy definition, means the protection
6lof western interest."
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sent Giscard what 
Soviet sources described as a sharp message after the Kol­
wezi operation. Giscard replied with public criticisms of 
Soviet violations of human rights. The tension eased only 
after the foreign ministry's African affairs director, Guy 
Gregory, visited Moscow to explain the French action. Accord­
ing to one source, he pointed out that France was in Africa 
to defend its interests there and that the French had no 
intention of becoming America's Cubans in Africa.
Having proved that they can be useful in performing 
missions that the Americans are in no position to undertake, 
the French have become serious foreign policy partners of 
the United States in Africa. One commentator has noted that 
"unlike de Gaulle, who always seemed to leave American offi­
cials wondering if his cooperation, when it did occur, was 
not a prelude to finding a new way to tweak Uncle Sam's 
beard, Giscard has gone out of his way to act as a loyal 
partner. When he opposes the United States, he always seems 
to convey the message that he is being a loyal opponent, and 
opposes Washington only on a specific issue.
De Gaulle established a reputation as a protector 
of moderate African governments by intervening militarily in 
black Africa three times in his eleven years in power. In 
the year between May 1977 and May 1978* Giscard committed
6^French forces on five fronts in Africa and the Middle East.
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Giscard's extension of French power to the continent of
Africa is a rather unique aspect of French foreign policy
in the Fifth Republic.
Giscard began improving his ability to operate in
Africa shortly after he assumed office in 1974. With General
Guy Mery, army chief of staff, he fashioned an elite corps
of 20,000 lightly-armed troops that could be airlifted to
Africa on eight hours' notice to fight brush-fire wars and
engage in counterinsurgency operations. Giscard can deploy
his quick-reaction forces almost at will. In the finest
tradition of de Gaulle, he ordered the paratroop jump on
Kolwezi after only perfunctorily consulting his cabinet
and ignoring parliament.^
France's interests in Africa justify Giscard's
activities there. Among the most ardent advocates of the
French presence are Morocco's King Hassan II, Senegal's
President Leopold Senghor and the Ivory Coast's President
Felix Houphouet-Boigny. There are 55>000 French citizens
in Morocco, 40,000 in the Ivory Coast, and 24,000 in Senegal,
66with all the economic interests their presence implies.
The French also have lucrative economic ties to Muammar
Kaddafi's Libya. There are 2,400 Frenchmen working in
Libya. During the 1970's France sold 164 Mirage jets,
twelve warships, and uncounted helicopters to the Kaddafi
regime. The Peugeot-Citroen automobile firm has contracted
to sell 30,000 cars in Libya this year. Several French firms
67have negotiated defense contracts there as well. In May 
1978 the Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-Boigny reiterated
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his country's dependence on France: "We count on the sup­
port of France. We have complexes about that ... There is 
no reason that France, faithful to its traditions, should
not honor its commitments toward us, that is to say, to
68come to our aid if we should be attacked." Giscard has
said that he favors Africans themselves being responsible
for security in Africa: "We should have an Africa Corps
69made up of Africans," he remarked.
Giscard has practical reasons for the growing 
French military presence in Africa. The troops there help 
protect France's interest in raw materials, including copper 
in Zaire and uranium in Chad. He has reaped political bene­
fits from his show of power in Africa: his popularity in­
creased dramatically after the airlift of Moroccan troops 
to Zaire in April 1977 • Giscard's African policy also fills 
a void left by the United States when the American Congress 
voted to end military aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola in 
December 1976. Although French officials admit to nothing, 
it is widely assumed that France is supplying arms and am­
munition to the UNITA guerrillas of southern Angola, who
continue to battle the ruling MPLA faction and the Cubans 
70there. In June 1978 French Foreign Minister Louis de 
Guiringaud described the French effort to fill the void as 
follows: "It is probable that the weakening or the disappear­
ance of a certain kind of American presence in the world today 
encouraged the Soviets to profit in these various situations
of tension. What we are trying to do above all is help the
71Africans themselves take control of their problems."
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Giscard described the process as pre-empting a vacuum: "In
Africa, I think it is more a matter of targets of opportunity
than a grand plan. When a vacuum is created, as was the case
in Angola, the Soviets fill it. The same thing has happened
in Ethiopia. But when the vacuum was pre-empted by others,
72they did not persist.”1
The 10,000 French troops stationed in Africa in 
1978 constituted a foreign force second only to Cuba's ^0,000. 
They were spread across the continent in small units. (See 
table on page 92. ) ^
In addition to its African contingency, France main­
tained 1,200 U.N. peace-keeping troops in Lebanon. In Febru­
ary 1980 the French had the largest permanent naval presence 
in the Indian Ocean of all the western allies, with four 
heavily armed frigates and a command ship based at Djibouti,
plus eight transport vessels, destroyers, and patrol ships
7 k
operating from La Reunion Island. These forces together 
comprised the largest French military presence abroad since 
the end of the Algerian war in 1962..^
In December 1977 Senegal's President Leopold Senghor 
provided France its most important base in black Africa. 
Giscard established a tactical wing of ten Jaguar jets at 
a base near Dakar. In May 1978 fighting broke out between 
Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara, which both 
sides claimed. France's ten Jaguar jets flew air strikes to 
protect underpopulated Mauritania against incursions by the 
Algerian-backed and Soviet-armed Polisario guerrillas fighting
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550 troops and advisers 




9,000 troops and advisers
Source: Newsweek, 5 June 1978, pp. 59 and 6l.
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for control of the Spanish Sahara. The Jaguars killed 
dozens of guerrillas in an attack on a convoy in Mauritania 
early in May, and continued to fly reconnaissance and haras-
rp /T
sment missions throughout the campaign.
Other French missions in 1978 included protecting 
Chad's government from Libyan-backed guerrillas. French 
forces particpated as U.N. peace-keepers in the former French 
mandate of Lebanon that year and three French soldiery died 
in the fighting. Some ^,000 French troops were still sta­
tioned in Djibouti a year after it was granted independence 
in July 1977. One of France's three aircraft carriers con­
tinues to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa to protect
77French oil routes there. '
France withdrew 1,500 troops from Ghad in 1980, 
reducing its total commitment in Africa to approximately 
8,000. These forces are roughly divided among Djibouti 
(^,000), the: Central African Republic (1,270), Senegal 
(1 ,000), Gabon (800), and the Ivory Coast (800) . ^
Another aspect of Giscard's foreign policy that 
bears a striking similarity.to his strengthening of ties 
with the EEC, NATO, and French Africa is his special rela­
tionship with Germany. Giscard and German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt enjoy a personal friendship that is reminiscent of 
de Gaulle's reconciliation with Konrad Adenauer two decades 
ago. The Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 established 
semi-annual meetings between the two heads of state. Over the 
past decade Schmidt and Giscard both former finance ministers,
9A
have met dozens of other times. Officials in Bonn describe 
their relationship as relaxed. A French aid noted that the 
two men have great esteem for one another and that they have 
confidence in each other's intellect. Giscard*s relaxed 
style has been an asset in his dealings with Schmidt, who 
is often moody and impatient. Giscard has kept his advice 
to the chancellor private, knowing Schmidt does not appreciate 
being lectured in public. The two speak frequently by phone, 
usually in English, though they understand each other's lang­
uage. Schmidt once told an assembled delegation that he and 
Giscard spend a lot of time discussing history, comparing
their peoples* common problems, and drawing conclusions from 
79them.
Their special relationship has translated into 
concrete policies, particularly in the realm of European 
integration. Aside from the proposed monetary union, the 
two leaders have collaborated on such issues as direct elec­
tion of a European Parliament and expansion of the Common 
Market to include Spain, Greece, and Portugal. "Giscard has 
a much clearer concept of the vital elements of our relation­
ship," said a German official. "His policy is to avoid unneces­
sary friction and not to confront the U.S. That has eliminated 
a major problem for us."^
Despite the French emphasis on the Third World,
Giscard has made a special effort to cultivate good relations 
with the Germans. Keeping Paris and Bonn together during the 
opening phase of the Afghanistan crisis proved especially 
difficult. Giscard is aware that together Germany and France
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are the world’s third power--economically, militarily, and 
politically.
Giscard does not discount the threat that the War­
saw Pact poses to France and Germany. In a May 25» 1978 
address before the U.N. General Assembly’s special session 
on disarmament he stressed the need to find a way to reduce 
the Warsaw Pact’s superiority over NATO in conventional 
weapons. For example, he noted that the Warsaw Pact has 
three times as many tanks as NATO. He called for a new Euro­
pean security conference that would seek to negotiate a 
balanced reduction in the enormous arsenals of conventional 
weapons possessed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.
In the course of his address he unveiled several ambitious 
arms control proposals. The French president suggested the 
creation of a new international agency that would monitor 
arms agreements through the use of satellites, and called
for the establishment of a world institute for disarmament
... 82 studies.
Giscard is willing to recognize France's status as 
a medium power in the modern world. "The Elysee takes the 
view," according to one observer, "that all of de Gaulle's 
pretensions to great-power status are finished, but that we 
need to show that we are a medium power that has the means
oq
and the willingness to make itself respected." Speaking at 
a special press conference on foreign affairs in February 1979» 
Giscard suggested the creation of a medium-power triangle.
He proposed a summit conference of Western Europe, African,
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and Arab leaders, clearly excluding the United States, the
8A
Soviet Union, and China.
One analyst suggests that Giscard's foreign policy 
is dedicated to ending France's isolation from NATO, the Medi­
terranean, and the United States. In particular Giscard is 
wholly committed, as he states in French Democracy, to the 
notion of European union and the establishment of a functional 
parliament in Strasbourg. Giscard has abandoned several key 
elements of Gaullist foreign policy. He is less inclined 
than his predecessors to balance France between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, or to alternately undermine the 
policies of Washington and Moscow. He is more concerned with 
the creation of a united Europe than with the formation of 
an independent Europe under the leadership of France. Finally, 
he appears to view the nuclear strike force as a credible 
nuclear deterrent within the confines of the Atlantic alliance 
rather than independent of it. Nostalgia for the past has 
given way to exploring the opportunities of the present. 
Cooperation has replaced confrontation as the watchword of 
French foreign policy.^
Conclusions
(l) Giscard's experiences as a technocrat and civil servant 
molded his world view. Like Pompidou before him he is an 
intellectual. Unlike his predecessors, he governs by coali­
tion rather than by majority. His often slim margin of 
victory demonstrates his political shrewdness and ability to 
survive.
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(2) The death of Pompidou catapulted Giscard into the natio­
nal consciousness. He is an opportunist who has exploited 
other situations (particularly in Africa) to the fullest.’
(3) Support for Giscard within the French electorate is 
predominantly conservative, rural, and female. He has suc­
cessfully deflected challenges from both the alliance to 
the left and the Gaullists, contributing to the formation of 
a new centrist force in French politics.
(^) Giscard has abandoned the politics of grandeur in an 
effort to establish France as a medium power. He still 
jealously guards France's independence in foreign policy, 
especially in the matter of its nuclear strike force.
(5) Giscard's style is distinctly European. He has tried to 
promote regional integration through French participation 
in the EEC, NATO, and the European Parliament. He has 
strengthened ties with the United States and Britain. His 
low-key, relaxed style has placed France on cordial terms 
with its allies for the first time since de Gaulle came to 
power in 1958. Westerners are comfortable with Giscard's 
emphasis on cooperation instead of confrontation. Americans 




Chapter One established five general criteria and 
three specific issues by which to compare the leaders of the 
Fifth Republic. The following tables seek to characterize 




De Gaulle was the soldier-states- 
man;
Pompidou was the administrator- 
intellectual ; '
Giscard is the technocrat- 
philosopher.
De Gaulle's presidency was born 
of the Algerian crisis;
Pompidou's presidency grew from 
his close relationship with 
de Gaulle;
Giscard's presidency resulted 
from Pompidou's death.
De Gaulle was originally supported 
by the people in a series of plebi­
scites and later by a Gaullist maj­
ority in the National Assembly; 
Pompidou was originally supported 
by de Gaulle and later by a Gaul­
list majority in the National 
Assembly;
Giscard was originally supported 
by conservative, rural, and female 
voters and later by a Centrist 






De Gaulle was originally opposed 
by the National Assembly, which 
he dissolved after a vote of no- 
confidence in 1962, and later 
resigned after receiving a nega­
tive vote in the plebiscite of 
1969;
Pompidou received a vote of no- 
confidence as Premier in 1962 
and was later dismissed by de 
Gaulle in 1968;
Giscard was dismissed by de Gaulle 
in 1965* was opposed by leftist, 
urban, and male voters in 197^» 
and was challenged by the Commu­
nists, Socialists, and Gaullists 
in 1978.
De Gaulle was obsessed with power, 
prestige, and independence; 
Pompidou continued to pursue the 
General's objectives of power, 
prestige, and independence;
Giscard prefers medium power, res­
pect and independence.
De Gaulle was a confrontational, 
unpredictable egotist;
Pompidou was a pragmatic, metho­
dical, negotiator;




De Gaulle sought to limit the 
Common Market to the Six and ex­
clude Great Britain from member­
ship ;
Pompidou preferred to expand the 
Common Market to nine members 
and admit Britain;
Giscard seeks to further expand 
the Common Market to twelve mem­
bers, including Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal.
De Gaulle withdrew France from 
NATO in 1966 and stressed the 
development of his independent 
nuclear strike force;
Pompidou maintained France's dis­
tance from NATO and at the same 
time de-emphasized the importance 
of the nuclear strike force;
100
Giscard has steered France back 
toward the alliance and has de­
fined the terms under which he 
would consider using the nuclear 
strike force.
(8) East-West Relations : De Gaulle balanced France between
the superpowers, favoring neither, 
and supported French Africa; 
Pompidou engaged in summitry, 
emphasizing the nonaligned Third 
World, and supported French 
Africa;
Giscard opposed the policy of 
blocs, favoring the establishment 
of a medium power triangle, and 
has intervened actively in French 
Africa.
A poll conducted in France in 1967 asked the follow­
ing question: "Which features of French foreign policy, if
any, are likely to persist after de Gaulle?'" Thirty-four per­
cent of respondents foresaw a continuation of uncooperative 
French policies toward the United States and NATO. Twenty- 
seven percent predicted a continuation of the Franco-German 
rapprochement. Fifteen percent anticipated a continuation of 
de Gaulle's policies in the Mideast. Only twelve percent 
expected a continuation of the General's policies toward the 
non-Western countries, particularly Southeast Asia and China.
In short, the respondents expected that the Gaullist style 
of somewhat prickly and self-assertive diplomacy might be 
modified in relatively marginal matters, but would persist 
in substance.'*'
Events have not borne out this expectation. French 
foreign policy since de Gaulle has changed in both style and 
substance. Pompidou's foreign policy differed from de Gaulle's 
in several basic respects,, not the least of which was the 
emphasis placed on nuclear weapons. Pompidou tended to
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discount the role of the nuclear strike force in the interna­
tional arena, while de Gaulle paraded it before the world.
A second major difference was that while de Gaulle's world
view was global, Pompidou's was regional. De Gaulle's reach
2quite often exceeded his grasp, but Pompidou's vision rarely
extended beyond Europe, the Meditteranean, and North Africa.
He considered it more important for France to be able to
respond rapidly to challenges within its immediate sphere
of influence than to involve itself in protracted wars of
attrition as in Indochina and Algeria.^
One major area of similarity between de Gaulle and
Pompidou was their opposition to the SALT negotiations and
to arms limitation treaties in general. Both men felt that
SALT was an affront to the independence of France, a treaty
carefully calculated by the superpowers to exclude the rest
of the world. De Gaulle and Pompidou regularly practiced
the politics of the empty chair at nuclear disarmament con- 
Ll
ferences. The French often refused to attend disarmament 
conferences on the grounds that they were intended to rein­
force nuclear monopoly among those states that already pos­
sessed nuclear weapons. They boycotted talks on mutual 
balanced force reductions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on the grounds that any accommodation reached 
between the superpowers would weaken the defense of Western 
Europe. They refused to participate in the SALT talks for 
the same reason.
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Under Pompidou France's arms sales abroad soared.
In 1970 France replaced Britain as the world's third largest
arms exporter, behind the United States and the Soviet Union.
The success of the Mirage fighter-bomber during the 19&7
Arab-Israeli war sparked particular interest in French arma-
6ments among buyers in the Mideast.
Pompidou focused his political gas inward, toward 
France and Frenchmen; de Gaulle looked outward, toward the 
world and affairs of state. One analyst has noted that "as 
much by default as by desire, the Pompidou government focused 
on strengthening its domestic political base and on encourag­
ing closer economic and political cooperation with its Euro­
pean partners rather than on promoting rapid changes on
7
defense questions at home and abroad."
Giscard has also differed from de Gaulle on key 
issues, particularly France's participation in the EEC and 
the NATO alliance. Although Giscard publicly follows official 
Gaullist doctrine that France will never rejoin the military 
part of the Atlantic alliance, French cooperation behind the
g
scenes in NATO is very broad nowadays.
Giscard is no Gaullist. He came to power with the
image of a friend of the United States rather than a Gaullist-
style adversary. This change in style is Giscard's most sal-
9lent contrast with his predecessors.
Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Val6ry 
Giscard d'Estaing have all left their personal mark on French 
foreign policy during the past 23 years. Each president had 
a unique style that determined the flavor of his country's
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activities aborad, and that reflected in the conduct of 
France's foreign affairs. As long as de Gaulle's Fifth 
Republic endures, its presidents will continue to mold 
France's foreign policies to their own personalities. It 
is this aspect of French foreign policy that makes it such 
an intriguing topic to the student of international relations.
NOTES
Introduction
^Although the National Assembly voted de Gaulle 
into power on June 1, 1958, he did not possess legal execu­
tive authority until his election to office on December 21, 
1958.
2
Henry W. Ehrman, Politics in France (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 35^*
-^Charles de Gaulle, "The need for a strong state," 
Speech delivered at Bayeux, June 16, 1946.
Ll .
Roy Pierce, French Politics and Political Insti­
tutions (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 21. There is
a distinction in French between external policy and foreign 
policy. The former applied to all the colonies, including 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Since these colo­
nies were part of France, they were not handled by the 
foreign ministry. Foreign policy applied only to foreign 
governments. This study makes no such distinction and in­
cludes colonial policy within the purview of foreign policy.
^Charles de Gaulle, "The need for a strong state," 
Speech delivered at Bayeux, June 16, 1946.
Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de 
Gaulle (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965) P« 31-
7 . . .'Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, Three
Essays (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) P» 15*
g
Grosser, p. 24; W. W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the 
World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1966) p. 7*
^Kulski, p. 38.
■^Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 19721 p. 27•
^Jean Blondel and E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., The 





"^Arthur S. Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the 
World: 1977 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977)»
p. 125.
14Michael Getler, "NATO: Will France Come Back?"
The Washington Post, September 1979.
"^Banks, p. 124.
1 ^
"Various French Polls in Accord on One Thing: 
Giscard Slipping." International Herald Tribune, 2 February
1981, p. 5 .
17James David Barber, The Presidential Character: 
Predicting Performance in the White House (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
Chapter I
^■Jean Lacouture , Da Gaulle, trans. Francis K. Price 
(New York: New American Library, Inc., 1966), p. 24.
2Sanche de Gramont, The French: Portrait of a 
People (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1969)> p« 89*
^Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword (New 
York: Criterion Books, i960), pp. 9-10.
^Ibid., p . 128.
■^Charles de Gaulle, The Army of the Future (Phila­
delphia, J. P. Lippincott Company, 194l7T PP* 8-9 .
Charles de Gaulle, The Comiolete War Memoirs (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 27*
7 •'Andre Malraux, Felled Oaks: Conversations with
de Gaulle (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972).
o
Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword (New 




12Roy Pierce, French Politics and Political Insti­
tutions (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 51*
106
^3Roy C. Macridis, French Politics in Transition:
The Years After de Gaulle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop 
Publishers, Inc., 1975)» PP« 13-14.
14
Edward A. Kolodziej, French Internal a. onal Policy 
under de Gaulle and Porrrpidou (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1974), p. 46l.
1<
Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 251> 466.
1 g
Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New 
York: Simon and Scuster, 1972), p. 83.
"^Kolodziej, pp. 458-459.
1 8
"To France With Love," Newsweek, 14 November 1977>
p. 67.
19 • .^Philippe Alexandre, The Duel: De Gaulle and
Pompidou, trans. Elaine P. Halperin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1972), p. 56.








2 6Karl W. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic 
Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967)> p. 37*
2^Kolodziej, p. 101.
28de Gramont, p. 178.
2^Kolodziej, p. 101.








38Macridis, pp. 22, 41.
3^Kolodziej, p. 241.
^ Ibid. , p. 247.
■^'"Ibid. , p. 242.
4?Ibid., p. 251.
^3Ibid., p. 336.
44 /John Ardagh, The New French Revolution (New York
Harper and Row, 1969) » P* XIII.
4 2•^Alexandre, p. 101.
46Kolodziej, p. 350; Kulski, p. 57*
^Kulski, p. 60.
48Banks, ed., p. 123*
^Alexandre, p. 309- 
3^Malraux.
3^Kolodziej, p. 430.






D Michel Andr6ani, interview held in Montpellier, 
France, 2 May 1975*




6?Henry A. Tanner, "A stronger de G a u l l e The New 
York Times, 22 April 1966, p. 4.
^3Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New 
York; Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 36-52.
3^Roy C. Macridis, De Gaulle: Implacable Ally (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 153-154.
^3Kolodziej., p. 492.
^Alexandre, p. 26l; Kolodziej, pp. 500-501.
^Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 570-577*
Chapter II
■^ Roy C. Macridis, French Politics in Transition:
The Years After de Gaulle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop
Publishers, Inc. , 1975) > P.* 68.
2A1exandre, p . 53•
3Merry Bromberger, Le Pestin Secret de Georges 
Pompidou (Paris: Librairie Arthbme Fayard, 1965)» P* 7*
^Alexandre, p. 55*
3Ibid., p . 141.
8Ibid ., p . 158.
2Ibid, p. 240.
o
Kolodziej, p. 400; Macridis, p. 27.
9
xAlexandre, p . 3•
^°Macridis, p. 51 
~^*~Ibid. , p . 96 .
^2de Gramont, p. 235*
^3Macridis, p. 31*
~^Ibid. , p . 37 •
^3de Gramont, p. 324.
■*~8Kolodzie j , p. 439*
•^Macridis, p. 41. 
l8Kolodziej, p. 401.
19Ibid, p. 407, Macridis, pp. 42 
20Kolodziej, p. 432, Macridis, p 
2^Kolodziej, p. 433* Macridis, p 
22Macridis, p. 5°.












33Kolodziej, pp. 429-430. 








'Annee Politique 1962, p. 695* Pompidou's 




^ I b i d . ,  p p .  5 8 4 - 5 8 5 -
Chapter III
^Ronald Koven, "Giscard Assumes Role of Philosopher 
During Summer of France's Discontent," The Washington Post,
21 September 1979?/ P« A22.
2Joseph Kraft, "Giscard's Opportunity," The Washing­
ton Post, 21 March 1978, p. A17.
-^"Giscard Technocrat," L'Express 1178, 4-10 February 
1974, p. 10.
4 . ■ . ^Macridis, p. 16.
-^"L'Image publique de M. Giscard d'Estaing," L' Ex­





Valery Giscard d'Estaing, French Democracy (New 




11Ibid. , p. 7.
12Ibid., p. 85.
■^Ibid. , p. 17.
14Ibid., p . 114.
1^Ibid.
*^Ibid. , p. 118.
17Ibid., p. 117
18t, • Ibid., p. 116.
Ill
~^Ibid. , pp. 116-118.
20Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics in France (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), p. 239-
^Macridis, p. 101.
Ibid.• p. 120.
^ I b i d . , p . 101.
24Ibid., p. .120.
^Ibid. , p. 121.
2 6Ronald Koven, "France 
The Washington Post, 23
^"Giscard:
; 1193 > 20-26
Cent Jours 
• May 1974, ;
^Macridis, pp. 135-136
2^Ibid., p . 135.
-^Ibid. , p. 131.
^ Jim Hoagland, "Socialists Half Policy Talks with 
Communists in France," The Washington Post, 16 September 1977» 
p. A18.
32'Joseph Kraft, "Giscard's Opportunity," The Washing­
ton Post, 21 March 1978, p. A17.
33-'-'Walter Lacqueur, "French Left Discovers 'Gulag',"
The Wall Street Journal, 19 July 1977*
34^ Ronald Koven, "Giscard Meets Socialist Leader;




^ Jim Hoagland, "Barre Looks to U.S. for Image 
Boost," The Washington, Post, 12 September 1977> PP• A2, A20.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39 ^Clayton Fritchey, "Another Definition for Detente,"
The Washington Post, 3 June 1978, p. All; Arnaud de Borchgrave,
"Giscard Speaks Out," Newsweek, 25 July 1977* P* ^5•
^ Ibid. , pp. 45 and 46.
112
iii
Jim Hoagland, "Brezhnev in Paris Focuses on 
Detente," The Washington Post, 21 June 1977 > P* Al4.
if, 2
Don Obendorfer, "U.S. Voices Puzzlement at 
French Rejection of Afghan Talks," The Washington Post,
10 February 1980, p. A22.
^ J o h n  M. Goshko, "U.S.-French Hostility Clouds 
Vance Visit," The Washington Post, 22 February 1980, p. A22.
A A
Ronald Koven, "France Rejects a United Front 
Against Soviets," The, Washington Post, 9 February 1980, 
pp. A1 and Al6.
^hbid.
U6Ronald Koven, "France Deeply Split over Soviet 
Actions," The Washington Post, 23 February 1980, p. A20.
if,8
Jim Hoagland, "Domestic Politics Tame Giscard*s 
Foreign Policies," The Washington Post, 8 September 1977* 
p. A24.
IlQ
^Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Giscard Speaks Out," 
Newsweek, 25 July 1977r P* 47•
■^°Michael Getler, "NATOs Will France Come Back?"
The Washington Post, September 1979•
-^Kulski, p. 101; Kolodziej, p. 100.
<2 . . • .^ Roy C. Macridis, French Politics in Transition:
The Years After de Gaulle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthr.op
Publishers, Inc., 1975)» PP* 48-49.
-^Kolodzie j , p. 141.
5^1
-^de Gramont, p. 179*
-^Macridis, p. 38.
■^Kolodziej, pp. 578 and 584.
■^Macridis, pp. 144-145.
<9
.-"Arnaud de Brochgrave, "Africa's Policeman," 
Newsweek, 16 May 1977> pp. 58-59*
^°Kolodziej, p. 525*
■ Macridis, p. 38.
113
6lArnaud de Brochgrave, "Giscard Speaks Out," 
Newsweek, 25 July 1977» P*
6 2Ronald Koven, "French-Soviet Relations Warming 
Up," The Washington Post, 29 October 1978, pp• A29 and A36.
63Xbid.
64Ronald Kovan, "France’s New Role: Africa's
Gendarme," The Washington Post., 9 May 1978, p. A13.
85"Africa*s.Gendarme," Newsweek, 5 June 1978, 
p p . 59 and 61.
66
Ronald Kovan, "France's New Role: Africa's
Gendarme," The Washington Post, 9 May 1978, p. AI3 .
67'"Giscard*s Sound and Fury," Newsweek, 26 January
1981, p. ^0 .
68Ronald Koven, "African Leaders Fail to Agree on 
Joint Force," The Washington Post, 2 A May 1978, AlA.
^Milton R. Benjamin, "Giscard Calls for Talks on 
Reduction of Arms in Europe," The Washington Post, 26 May 1978, 
p. A31.
70' Ronald Koven, "France's New Role: Africa's
Gendarme," The Washington Post, 9 May 1978, p. A13.
71"Africa's Gendarme," Newsweek, 5 June 1978, 
p p . 59 and 61.
72Arnaud de Brochgrave, "Giscard Speaks Out," 
Newsweek, 25 July 1977, P* ^6.
73'^"Africa's Gendarme," Newsweek, 5 June 1978, 
pp. 59 and 6l.
7k
Michael Getler, "Role of U.S. Allies in a Persian 
Gulf War is Uncertain," The Washington Post, 10 February 1980, 
p. A22.
7 3■ '^'French Increasing Role m  Chad War," The Washing­
ton Post, 29 April 1978, p. A10.
76 . . .r "French Planes Attack Polisano Convoy m  Mauri­
tania," The Washington Post, 6 May 1978, p. Al6.
77Ronald Koven, "France's New Role: Africa's
Gendarme," The Washington Post, 9 May 1978, p. AI3 .
ry Q
"Giscard1s Sound and Fury," Newsweek, 26 January
1981, p. 40.
114
^Ronald Koven and Michael Getler, "A Bonn-Paris 
Axis,” The Washington Post, 17 September 1978* PP• A25i A30.
Ibid.
0-1
Ronald Koven, "France Deeply Split over Soviet 
Actions," The Washington Post, 23 February 1980, p. A20.
^Milton R. Benjamin, "Giscard Calls for Talks on 
Reduction of Arms in Europe," The Washington Post, 26 May 
1978, p. A31.
^Ronald Koven, "France*s New Role: Africa's
Gendarme," The Washington Post, 9 May 1978, p. AI3 .
84Ronald Koven, "Giscard Airs Criticism of Carter's 





-^Ibid. , pp. 152 and 163.
4






Ronald Koven and Michael Getler, "A Bonn-Paris 
Axis," The Washington Post, 17 September 1978, pp. A25> A30.
9
^Ronald Koven, "France Deeply Split over Soviet 




Alexandre, Philippe. The Duel; De Gaulle and Pompidou.
trans. Elaine P. Halperin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1972.
Ambrosi, Christian and Arlette. La France 1870-1970. Paris: 
Masson et Compagnie Editeurs, 1971*
Ardagh, John. The New French Revolution. New York: Harper
and Row, Publishers, 1969-
Avril, Pierre. Politics in France. Baltimore: Penguin
Books, Ltd., 1969*
Banks, Arthur S., ed. Political Handbook of the World: 1977■ 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977*
Barber, James David. The Presidential Character: Predicting
Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hal 1, 1972.
Blondel, Jean and Godfrey, E. Drexel. The Government of 
France. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968.
Bromberger, Merry. Le Destin Secret de Georges Pompidou. 
Paris: Libraririe Artheme Fayard, 1965*
Carmoy, Guy de. The Foreign Policies of France, 1944-1968. 
trans. Elaine P. Halperin. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
Cerny, Philip. Politics of Grandeur (De Gaulle1s Foreign 
Policies). Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1980.
Deutsch, Karl W. Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance:
Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967*
Duverger, Maurice. La Monarchie R^publicaine. Paris: Edi­
tions Robert Laffont, 1974.
Ehrmann, Henry W. Politics in France. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1968.
116
Estaing, Valery Giscard d'. French Democracy. trans. Vincent 
Cronin. New York: Doubleday and Company,) Inc., 1977*
Ferro, Maurice. De Gaulle et 1 *Am6rique; Une Amiti^- Tumul- 
tueuse. Paris: Plon, 1973*
French Foreign Policy. New York: Ambassade de France,
Service de Presse et d*Information, 1967.
Furniss, Edgar Stephenson. France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle 1s
Heritage and,Prospects. New York: Harper and Row, i960.
Gaulle, Charles de. The Army of the Future. Philadelphia:
J.P. Lippincott Company, 1941.
Gaulle, Charles de. The Complete War Memoirs. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1972.
Gaulle, Charles de. The Edge of the Sword. trans. Gerard
Hopkins. New York: Criterion Books, i960.
Gaulle, Charles de. La France et Son Antfee. Paris: Plon,
1938.
Gaulle , Charles de. Ma.jor Addresses, Statements, and Press
Conferences, May 19, 1958 - January 31, 1964. New York: 
Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d 'Information, 
1964.
Gaulle, Charles de. Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor.
trans. Terence Kilmartin. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1971.
Graebner, Norman A. Cold War Diplomacy. American Foreign 
Policy 1945-1960. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand 
C ompany, Inc., 1962.
Gramont, Sanche de. The French: Portrait of a People. New 
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1969*
Grosser, Alfred. French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle. trans. 
Lois Ames Pattison. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1967.
Hartley, Anthony. Gaullism: The Rise and Fall- of a Politi­
cal Movement. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1971*
Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign, Policy, Three Essays.
New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969*
Kohl, Wilfrid L. French Nuclear Diplomacy. Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1966.
117
Kolodziej, Edward A. French International Policy under de
Gaulle and Pompidou. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1974.
Kulski, W.W. De Gaulle and the World. New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1966.
Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle. trans. Francis K. Price.
New York: New American Library, Inc., 1966.
Leuthy, Herbert. France Against Herself. trans. Eric Mosbacher. 
New York: Meridian Books. 1957 •
Macridis, Roy C. De Gaulle: Implacable Ally. New York:
Herper and Row, 1966.
Macridis, Roy C., ed. Foreign Policy in World Politics. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
Macridis, Roy C. French Politics in Transition: The Years
After de Gaulle. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop
Publishers, Inc., 1975*
Malraux, Andr£. Felled Oaks: Conversations with de Gaulle. 
trans. Ir^ne Cl^phane. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1972.
Mignon, Ernest. Les Mots du Gen'eral. Paris: Librairie
Artheme Fayard, 1962.
Morse, Edward L. Foreign Policy and Interdependence in
Gaullist France. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1973*
Pactet, Pierre. Institutions Politiques, Droit Constitutionnel. 
Paris: Masson et Compagnie Editeurs, 1974.
Passeron, Andr£. De Gaulle Parle, 1962-1966. Paris: Librai­
rie Artheme Fayard, 1966.
Pierce, Roy. French Politics and Political Institutions.
New York: Harper and Row, 1968*
Reynaud, Paul. La Politique Etrangfere du Gaullisme. Paris:
R. Juillard, 1964.
Tint, Herbert. French Foreign Policy since the Second World 
War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972.
Wellard,.James. The French Foreign Legion. Boston: Little,




’’Africa's Gendarme." Newsweek, 5 June 1978, pp. 59 and 6l.
"L’Apres Pompidou." L * Express 118?, 8-14 April 1974, 
pp. 12-17•
Benjamin, Milton R. "Giscard Calls for Talks on Reduction 
of Arms in Europe." The Washington Post, 26 May 1978, 
p. A31.
Borchgrave, Arnaud de. "Giscard Speaks Out." Newsweek,
25 July 1977, pp. 45-48.
"Crise: Ce que Giscard Espere Changer." L ’Express 1216,
28 October-3 November 1974.
"De Gaulle had a System." Newsweek, 13 March 1978, p. 44.
"Le Duel Giscard-Chaban." L*Express 188, 15-21 April 1974» 
pp. 13-23.
Dupoirier, Elisabeth and Platone, Francois. "Une Nouvelle 
Etape dans le Declin du Social--Centrisme." La Revue 
Francaise de Science Politique XXXIV, December 1974, 
pp. 1173-1204.
Evans, Rowland and Novak, Robert. "Brzezinski Calls the 
Foreign Policy Shots." The Washington Post, 7 June 
1978, p. A27•
"French Increasing Role in Chad War." The Washington Post,
29 April 1978, p. A10.
"French Planes Attack Polisario Convoy in Mauritania."
The Washington Post, 6 May 1978, p. Al6.
Fritchey, Clayton. "Another Definition of Detente." The 
Washington Post, 3 June 1978, p. All.
Gaulle, Charles de. "The Need for a Strong State." Speech 
delivered at Bayeux, 16 June 1946.
119
Getler, Michael, "NATO: Will France Come Back?" The
Washington Post, September 1979-
Getler, Michael. "Role of U.S. Allies in a Persion Gulf 
War; is Uncertain." The Washington Post, 11 February 
1980, pp. A1 and A21.
"Giscard: Cent Jours pour tout changer." L*Express 11931
20-26 May 1974, pp. 15-18.
"Giscard on the Defensive," Newsweek, 19 January 1981,
pp. 20-21.
"Giscard's Sound and Fury." Newsweek, 26 January 1981, p. 40. 
"Giscard Technocrate." LfExpress 1178, 4-10 February 1974,
p. 10.
Goshko, John M. "U.S .-French Hostility Clouds Vance Visit." 
The Washington Post, 22 February 1980, p. A22.
"The Great Nuclear Debate: At Issue the Future of the French 
and British Deterrents." Time, 21 July 1980, pp. 4-10.
Hoagland, Jim. "Barre Looks to U.S. for Image Boost." The 
Washington Post, 12 September 1977> PP• A2 and A20.
Hoagland, Jim. "Brezhnev in Paris Focuses on Detente." The 
Washington Post, 21 June 1977> P- Al4.
Hoagland, Jim. "Domestic Politics Tame Giscard's Foreign
Policies." The Washington Post, 8 September 1977, P- A24.
Hoagland, Jim. "Socialists Halt Policy Talks with Communists 
in France." The Washington Post, 16 September 1977» 
p . A18.
"L'Image Publique de M. Giscard d'Estaing." L 'Express 1189, 
22-28 April 1974, p. 19-
"Inside No Man's Land." Newsweek, 10 April 1978, p. 48.
Jaffre, Jerome and Ranger, Jean. "Les Structures Electorates 
de la Gauche." La Revue Francaise de Science Politique 
XXXIV, December 1974, pp. 1149-1172.
Kissinger, Henry A. "Morality and Power: The Role of Human
Rights in Foreign Policy." The Washington Post, 25 
September 1977, P- C3 .
Kolodziej, Edward A. "France and the Atlantic Alliance:
Alliance with a De-Aligning Power." Polity, Spring 1970, 
vol. II, No. 3, PP- 241-266.
120
Koven, Ronald. "African Leaders Fail to Agree on Joint 
Force." The Washington Post , 24 May 1978, p. Al4.
Koven, Ronald. "France Deeply Split over Soviet Actions."
The Washington Post, 23 February 1980, p. A20.
Koven, Ronald. "France Rejects a United Front Against Soviets." 
The Washington Post, 9 February 1980, pp. A1 and Al6.
Koven, Ronald. "France's New Role: Africa's Gendarme."
The Washington Post, 9 May 1978, p. A13-
Koven, Ronald. "French-Soviet Relations Warming Up." The 
Washington Post, 29 October 1978, pp. A29 and A36.
Koven, Ronald. "Giscard Airs Criticism of Carter's World
Role." The Washington Post, 16 February 1979, P* A30*
Koven, Ronald. "Giscard Assumes Role of Philosopher During
the Summer of France's Discontent." The Washington Post,
21 September 1974, p. A22.
Koven, Ronald. "Giscard Meets Socialist Leader; French 
Political Gap Seen Easing." The Washington Post,
29 March 1978, p. Al6 .
Koven, Ronald. "Giscard Stakes Out New Role as Convert to
Gaullist Tactics." The Washington Post, 23 March 1980, 
p. A30.
Koven, Ronald. "Left May Change France's Africa Policy."
The Washington Post, 4 March 1978, p. A15-
Koven, Ronald. "The Legion is my Country, Legionnaires my 
Brothers." The Washington Post, 28 May 1978, pp. A29 
and A30.
Koven, Ronald. "Mitterrand, Young Activities Transform
Socialist Party." The Washington Post, 7 March 1978, 
p. A10.
Koven, Ronald and Getler, Michael. "A Bonn-Paris Axis."
The Washington Post, 17 September 1978, pp. A25 and A30
Kraft, Joseph. "Giscard's Opportunity." The Washington Post,
21 March 1978, p. A17.
Laquer, Walter. "French Left Discovers 'Gulag'." The Wall 
Street Journal, 19 July 1977-
"The Last Year of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy." International Af­
fairs, 1 July 1969*
121
Obendorfer, Don. "U.S. Voices Puzzlement at French Reject­
ion of Afghan Talks." The Washington Post, 10 February- 
1980, p. A22.
Rowen, Hobart. "Barre Pressed Organized Free Trade Talks
with Carter." The Washington Post, 18 September 1977> 
p . A12.
Segonac, Adalbert de. "French Politics Today: Fragmented,
Uncertain." The Washington Post, 29 November 1977* 
p. A19.
"To France With Love.” Newsweek, 14 November 1977» p» 87.
"Various French Polls in Accord on One Thing: Giscard Slip­





Born in Baltimore, Maryland, September 14,j1954. 
Graduated from Norfolk Academy in Norfolk, Virginia, June 
1972, A.B., College of William and Mary, 1976. M.A. candi­
date, College of William and Mary, 1976-81, with a concen­
tration in International Relations. The course requirements 
for this degree have been completed, but not the thesis:
The Foreign Policies of the Fifth Republic, A Study in 
Presidential Styles.
In March 1980, the author entered the Foreign Ser­
vice of the United States as a Vice Consul and Third Secretary 
of the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
